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 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Definition of the problem and limitation of scope 
The extended collective licence model is a Nordic invention aimed at resolving a certain 
type of problem within copyright law. Despite being the very backbone of copyright 
protection, the exclusive nature of copyright entails certain undesirable consequences, as 
seen both from the perspective of the author and that of society: The need for the user to 
obtain authorisation from the author does at times entail transaction costs of such a scale 
that the user refrains from seeking the required consent, or from using the work at all. In 
general terms it can be asserted that the non-conclusion of any contract that in lack of 
administrative costs would have been concluded is undesirable. The extended collective 
licence seeks to counter the effect of this situation. 
 
While the nations traditionally have been free to regulate copyright protection vis-à-vis 
their citizens, international instruments such as the Berne Convention
1
 have bound the 
signatories to grant citizens of the other member states certain minimum rights. In the later 
years, these obligations have been amended with new sorts of minimum rights in new 
international instruments, some of which even require the minimum rights to apply to the 
citizens of the signatory state. The rising interest for copyright protection within the 
European Community (EC) has also prompted the adoption of community legislation 
harmonising certain parts of copyright protection in the member states. 
 
The said international obligations are usually formulated as a requirement to confer upon 
the authors an exclusive right to authorise the use of their works. By implication it is illegal 
to use a work without such authorisation. In turn, most of these instruments permit the 
member states to make certain exceptions and limitations to this right. Many of these 
                                                 
1
 For an introduction to the convention, see 3.3.1.1. 
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„exclusionary provisions‟ dictate rather clearly how the right is to be limited, and the extent 
to which it may be limited. Others, however, are vaguer. Notably the so-called „three-step 
test‟, which over the years has been implemented in several of the said instruments, is a 
rather vague formula for determining the permissibility of a limitation. 
 
The question to be discussed in this thesis is whether- and to which extent the extended 
collective licence model is in harmony with the obligations under the mentioned 
international instruments. Except in a few EC directives, the model has not been directly 
addressed on an international level.  
 
A first question is whether the model at all is at variance with the exclusive right. Provided 
the question can be answered in the affirmative, the objective is to examine the extent to 
which the exclusionary provisions permit that the exclusive right be modified by an 
extended collective licence. 
 
The answer to these questions may vary according to the instrument in question. The 
formulation of the different rights and exceptions is not always consistent, nor is the 
material content of the rights. Furthermore, the extended collective licence model is a 
concept rather than a reference to one single type of legal provision, meaning that the 
answer needs not be the same irrespective of how the extended collective licence is 
constructed. 
 
In the choice of which conventions and exclusionary provisions to treat, an objective has 
been to provide discussions of the broadest possible relevance. In this respect, the choice 
has been made to discuss the compatibility of the extended collective licence model with 
the above-mentioned „three-step test‟. Incorporated inter alia in article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention, article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and article 13 of the WTO TRIPS-
agreement, the three-step test has become a widespread method of crafting exclusionary 
provisions in international copyright, governing limitations on a multitude of exclusive 
rights. As there is reason to interpret the different three-step tests much in the same way, 
 3 
and considering their widespread use, examining the compatibility of the extended 
collective licence with the three-step test will yield conclusions of general relevance. In 
addition to the three-step test in article 9(2), the Berne Convention contains other 
exclusionary provisions of relevance to the extended collective licence model, notably 
articles 10(2) and 11bis(2). While these are of central interest to certain particular extended 
collective licences (sections 13b and 30 of the Norwegian Copyright Act in particular, see 
2.3.1 below), their general relevance in the discussion of the extended collective licence 
model is on the other hand smaller, hence they will not be discussed here. 
 
Pertaining to the choice of legal instruments, apart from their common employment of a 
three-step test, the choice of the TRIPS-agreement and the Berne Convention owes to their 
very practical significance: Through the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO the member 
states may unilaterally seek binding dispute settlement.
2
 
 
The second main theme in this thesis is the compatibility of the extended collective licence 
model with EC law. This choice owes to its very practical relevance to national, Nordic 
legislation: Through the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the EFTA Court respectively, 
disputes over incorrect implementation of EC law may be settled in a binding manner, 
without prior consent from the member states.  
 
EC legislation contains several instruments that can be relevant to the ECL-model. I have 
chosen to discuss the relation to Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, for two reasons: Firstly, it 
has a kinship with the above-mentioned conventions, both with respect to the overlap of 
protected subject-matter as well as with respect to the employment of a three-step test to 
limit the imposition of limitations. With regard to the application of the test, the 
argumentation in relation to the above-mentioned conventions is, as will be seen, valid also 
for the directive. Secondly, the directive explicitly accepts the extended collective licence 
                                                 
2
 See 3.3.1.3 
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model as non-conflicting with the directive. As such, it is the most explicit recognition of 
the model within international copyright. The significance of this recognition is however 
rendered dubious by an apparent methodological problem: The extended collective licence 
is only mentioned in the preamble – not in the operational clauses of the directive. While 
this is not problematic insofar as the preamble is an important source to the interpretation 
of Community directives, problem arises in that the wording of the rights granted may 
hardly be interpreted as consistent with the compulsory element of the model. In such cases 
of clear conflict, settled practice from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) shows that the 
preamble may not derogate from a clear wording. This conflict is treated in chapter 7. 
 5 
 
2 The extended collective licence model 
2.1 Introduction 
In short, „extended collective licence‟ (ECL) refers to the situation where a licence 
agreement freely negotiated between a collective management organisation (CMO) and a 
user – typically an institution – by legal provision is extended onto the works of rights 
holders who are not members of the CMO.  
 
Under normal circumstances, CMOs only have the power to license the use of the works 
that they represent according to voluntary agreement with the rights holder. This is also the 
outset for the ECL. However, if the CMO is deemed representative for the category of 
authors whose works are to be licensed, and provided there exists a legal provision 
imposing an ECL for the particular field, the extension may take place. In effect, the user is 
legally able to use the works of all authors within the concerned category on terms of use 
equal to those of the licence agreement, although the non-represented authors have not 
authorised this use. 
 
The ECLs in many respects resemble the mandatory collective licence-schemes
3
 by relying 
on a collective to conclude licence agreements that cover a whole category of works. The 
main difference, however, is that the ECL does not entail any automatic transfer of rights to 
the collective. Rather the contrary: The CMO must operate on a voluntary basis, and as 
long as no licence agreement is concluded, the non-member authors retain their exclusive 
right to authorise (or prohibit) the use of their works. Additionally, the Norwegian ECLs 
                                                 
3
 As implemented e.g. in France in the field of reprography, cf. article L. 122-10 of the French Intellectual 
Property Code. 
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are crafted such as to respect any individual agreement already concluded between the user 
and the author.
4
 The same applies to agreements concluded after the ECL has taken effect. 
 
The very purpose of the ECL is to counter market failure, by providing a means of 
facilitated, smooth rights clearance. Whilst the model in practice implies that the author is 
forced to share his right to authorise the use of his work with the collective, the purpose of 
the ECL is normally not to intentionally disrespect the will of the author.
5
 The cases where 
this happens are regarded as unfortunate side effects. Pursuant to the ECL, the author 
should as far as possible be afforded a say in the use of his work, and his economic rights 
be saved as far as possible. 
 
The ability of the ECL to counter market failure will hopefully become clearer during the 
course of this thesis. At this stage, I will only provide an outline of the concept of rectifying 
the consequences of market failure. The concept „market failure‟ is not very precise. It 
seems that the term has been subject to many polarized debates.
6
 Both words „market‟ and 
„failure‟ are inherently vague, and may be interpreted differently depending on the 
perspective of the interpreter. To some, a market failure in the field of copyright implies 
only that the rights holder is incapable of maintaining control over the use of his work. 
When digital rights management systems (DRM) become effective enough to allow 
absolute control of the use of the work, the proponents regard the market to be functional 
again. Others use „market failure‟ as an umbrella for a certain kind of normative arguments 
that should justify the imposition of copyright limitations, whilst yet others use the term in 
a purely factual and value-neutral way. In the following, „market failure‟ will be used as a 
value-neutral reference to the factual situation of licence agreements not being concluded 
although there is a certain potential for such contracting if the transaction costs were lower. 
                                                 
4
 This relies on an interpretation of the Norwegian ECL-provisions, which will be accounted for in more 
detail in 2.3.1 below. 
5
 Although this could be the case with certain individual ECLs, cf. below.  
6
 Cf. the account in Robert Burrell and Allison Coleman, Copyright Exceptions: The Digital Impact, 
Cambridge 2005, p. 167 ff. 
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Said differently, there is a market failure if both the users and the rights holders want to 
conclude licence agreements, but are prevented from doing so because of [prohibitively] 
high transaction costs. In this case, there are two different outcomes, namely that the 
market failure incites the users to make use of the works illegally, or that the users abstain 
from using the works at all. In the first case above, the initial prohibition against using 
works without authorisation is ineffective, while in other cases it is effective due to a higher 
risk of detection. Furthermore, the first case implies that the author is unable to control and 
thus derive profit from the [illegal] use of his work. In the latter situation, the author is 
deprived of a remuneration he otherwise could have obtained, and society is deprived of a 
desirable dissemination of works. 
 
Evidently, certain interests – both on the side of the users and authors – suffer from market 
failure.
7
 By providing a means of facilitated rights clearance, it is presumed that the ECL 
manages to serve these interests, most notably the authorial interest in receiving 
remuneration, and the user-specific (public) interest in maximum dissemination of works as 
well as the interest in avoiding illegality. Although much the same could have been 
achieved with a compulsory licence, the ECL has certain features that render it even more 
efficient in countering the effects of market failure, as well as features that render it less 
prejudicial on the interests of the rights holders. 
 
2.2 Historical overview and terminology 
The model of extended collective licences is not homogenous, but is an abstraction of a 
number of different provisions that share a common core.  
 
The first ECL was introduced in the Nordic copyright acts in the early 1960s.
8
 It concerned 
the act of broadcasting, and was devised as a solution to the problem of inefficient rights 
                                                 
7
 Where these are called on to justify the imposition of a limitation, e.g. in relation to the three-step test, they 
will be mentioned explicitly, in order to keep the term „market failure‟ as neutral as possible. 
8
 In Norway, in the Norwegian Copyright Act of May 12 1961 nr. 2. 
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clearance for broadcasts of the time. The broadcasters depended on using copyright 
material, but it proved far too complicated to clear the rights in advance of the 
transmission. They had concluded contracts with major collecting societies that provided 
them with blanket licences for the use of their catalogue, but obviously the collectives did 
not represent all rights holders.
9
 In consequence the broadcasters made use of the material 
they needed without regard to the need for licence, and remunerated only the authors who 
demanded payment.
10
 Clearly, this situation of illegal use was unacceptable. The authors 
opposed the imposition of a compulsory licence, and the ECL was introduced as a 
compromise.
11
 Since its inception, the number of ECLs has multiplied in pace with the 
evolving need for facilitated rights clearance. The resulting provisions are presented briefly 
below.  
 
In the following, the model of extended collective licences is referred to as the “ECL-
model”, the individual legal provisions which impose the extended effect as “ECL-
provisions”, and the individual licence agreements concluded between the CMOs and the 
users which form the basis for the subsequent extension as “ECL-agreements”. Where 
there is no risk for confusion, “ECL” is sometimes used alone, in which case the meaning 
is evident from the context. 
 
2.3 Presentation of the individual ECLs 
2.3.1 The Norwegian ECLs 
2.3.1.1 Introduction 
The Norwegian Copyright Act
12
 (NCA) contains 7 different ECL-provisions, which will be 
presented briefly below. The other Nordic countries have a similar number of ECLs which 
                                                 
9
 Ot.prp. nr. 26 (1959-1960) p. 51-59 
10
 Ole-Andreas Rognstad, ”Avtalelisenser”, Nordiskt Immateriellt Rättsskydd, nr. 2/2004, p. 151-159 (p. 152) 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Act of May 12 1961 nr. 2. 
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cover approximately the same areas. In 2008, however, a unique new ELC-provision was 
added to the Danish Copyright Act
13
 (DCA). Since the scope of this new ECL is of central 
interest to the following discussion, it will be presented separately in subchapter 2.3.2. 
 
2.3.1.2 Section 13b NCA – Reproduction for internal use in educational 
establishments 
Section 13b NCA introduces an ECL for the act of reproduction for use in own educational 
activities. The ECL was the result of a Nordic legal cooperation in the seventies, resulting 
in four nearly identical provisions in Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway.
14
 From its 
introduction in 1979 until 2005, it covered only analogue reproduction (paper copies), but 
in 2005 it was extended to cover also digital reproduction (from and to digital media, 
including digital uses of the digital copy, e.g. for virtual classrooms on the school 
intranet.)
15
 
 
Section 13b allows reproduction for use within own educational activity of published 
works. This implies a restriction in five dimensions: Firstly, the original may only be 
reproduced. Secondly, the resulting copy may be used in whatever way necessary for the 
purpose of education, restricted however to use within own educational activity.
16
 Thirdly, 
both the reproduction and the subsequent use must be for educational purposes. Fourthly, 
the work to be used pursuant to section 13b must be published in the sense of section 8(2) 
NCA.
17
 Fifthly, as mentioned only in the preparatory works of the ECL, the ECL is 
                                                 
13
 Act of June 20 2008 nr. 587 (latest amendment) 
14
 Cf. NU 1973: 21 
15
 Cf. Act of June 17 2005 nr. 97 
16
 „Educational activity‟ is a translation of the Norwegian word „undervisningsvirksomhet‟, which may refer 
both to the activity of imparting knowledge, and to the institutions providing such services. According to 
Ot.prp. nr. 46 (2004-2005) p. 65, „educational activity‟ refers to “the impartment of knowledge in organised 
forms”, consequently excepting inter alia ad hoc seminars from the scope of the provision. 
17
 For all practical purposes, the concept of publication in section 8(2) NCA corresponds to the concept of 
publication in article 3(3) of the Berne Convention. 
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delimited against use that verges on activities normally undertaken by a publisher (e.g. 
multiple copying of entire works).
18
 
 
Apart from the mentioned restrictions, the closer delimitation of the use is left to the CMO 
(section 36(1) which will be presented in 2.3.1.9 below). In other words, as long as an 
authorised CMO has concluded a licence agreement with a user, the terms of the agreement 
are extended onto the non-represented works as well, provided that the terms of use do not 
exceed the above-mentioned restrictions. In such cases, the exceeding terms apply only 
with respect to the works of the member authors. 
 
Lastly, section 13b also allows for fixation of broadcasts, on the same terms as the above, 
except where the broadcast consists of cinematographic works that must be perceived as 
intended also for uses other than presentation through television.  
 
2.3.1.3 Section 14 NCA – Reproduction for internal use in businesses 
Section 14 NCA imposes an ECL pursuant to which public and private institutions, 
organisations and commercial enterprises may, for use within own activities, reproduce 
published works, provided they are covered by a relevant ECL-agreement. Introduced in 
1995, the ECL covered only analogue reproduction until 2005, when it was extended to 
cover digital reproduction as well.
19
 
 
The ECL is limited in five dimensions: Firstly, it has a personal limitation which, 
admittedly, is very wide: Both public and private institutions, organisations and 
commercial enterprises may benefit from the ECL. Secondly, the ECL is functionally 
limited to the act of reproduction (from the original). Thirdly, there is no explicit limit to 
                                                 
18
 Ot.prp.nr.46 (2004-2005) e.g. p. 144. Incidentally, this is to prevent the ECL from encroaching upon 
markets of regular exploitation of the work. As contended in the above chapters, the ECL is meant to combat 
the effects of market failure. 
19
 Act of June 17 2005 nr. 97 
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the forms of use that the resulting copy may be subjected to – „use within own activities‟ 
gives substantial freedom – but it must be limited to use within the institution.20 Fourthly, 
the work to be reproduced must have been published, and fifthly, the ECL may not cover 
reproduction of such a scale that it borders on activities normally undertaken by a 
publisher.
21
 
 
Apart from the mentioned restrictions on the scope of the ECL-provision in section 14, the 
closer delimitation is left to the CMO through its fixation of the terms of use pursuant to 
the ECL-agreement. In practice, as will be seen below, the extent of the licence agreements 
pursuant to this and the ECL of section 13b are much narrower than the scope of the 
provisions. 
 
Similar to section 13b, section 14 allows for the fixation of broadcasts on the same terms as 
above, with certain minor exceptions.  
 
2.3.1.4 Section 16a NCA – Reproduction in the archive-, library- and museum-
sector (ALM-sector) 
Introduced in 2005, section 16a NCA is one of the newest ECLs. Implemented as an 
addition to an already existing free-use provision for the ALM-sector (section 16), the main 
cause for its imposition appears to have been the wish to open up new markets through 
facilitated rights clearance, where before the need to acquire individual permission had 
proven prohibitive (untapped potential).
22
 Pursuant to section 16a, archives, libraries and 
                                                 
20
 The ECL consequently does not cover the activities of e.g. press clip agencies, since the press clips are not 
for use within own activities, but for sale to other institutions. This of course with the reservation that press 
clip agencies naturally may have an ECL for internal copying. 
21
 Ot.prp.nr.46 (2004-2005) e.g. p. 145 
22
 Cf. implicitly Ot.prp.nr.46 (2004-2005) 3.4.7. 
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museums (the „ALM-sector‟) may reproduce published works contained in their collections 
and make such works available to the public
23
, if covered by a relevant ECL-agreement.  
 
In terms of permitted acts, section 16a is of a much wider scope than e.g. section 13b. 
While the latter only allows for the reproduction of the original, and certain forms of 
subsequent use of the resulting copy, section 16a in principle allows for nearly all copyright 
relevant acts. As seen, the ECL is personally restricted to the ALM-sector, which 
comprises fairly large entities.
24
 Furthermore, whilst sections 13b and 14 have fairly 
constricted fields of operation due to the restriction on permitted purposes for which the 
reproduction may take place, section 16a seems to lack such a delimitation. When regarded 
in connection with the relatively intense use rendered possible by digital means of 
exploitation, it becomes apparent that this particular ECL places very few restrictions on 
the possible contents of the subsequent ECL-agreements. As with the two preceding ECLs, 
however, only published works may be used pursuant to this ECL, and additionally, the 
works to be used must be contained in the collections of the particular institution covered 
by the ECL-agreement. 
 
As with all ECLs, the further delimitation of scope is left to the parties to determine, 
through the fixation of licence terms in the ECL-agreement. In April 2009, the first ECL-
agreement within this field was concluded, allowing the National Library to make available 
on the Internet 50 000 books published in Norway in the 1790-ies, 1890-ies and 1990-ies, 
of which most are protected by copyright.
25
 The permitted use is delimited in several 
                                                 
23
 Direct translation of the Norwegian term “gjøre…tilgjengelig for allmennheten”, which is not only 
restricted to the act of making available a work through „on demand‟ services, but which also covers the act 
of communicating the work to the public through wireless as well as wire-bound means and the act of 
distributing copies. 
24
 Which entities within the ALM-sector that may be allowed to benefit from the ECL is subject to 
delimitation by section 16 NCA, pursuant to which the King (in practice the Ministry of Cultural Affairs) is 
given decisive power. 
25
 The agreement can be found on http://www.kopinor.no/avtaler/avtaleomraader/nasjonalbiblioteket 
(Norwegian only). 
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respects, one important limitation being that the books may only be made available in a 
read-only format (§ 4 of the agreement). Although section 16a is vast in scope, there is 
reason to believe – further strengthened by the formulation of the said agreement – that the 
future ECL-agreements will not necessarily use the freedom afforded under the ECL-
provision to its full extent. The ECL leaves the parties extensive freedom to enable them to 
conclude the most preferable licence agreement, their individual requirements taken into 
consideration. In practice, this could imply using the maximal limits in one respect, whilst 
imposing narrow restrictions in another. 
  
2.3.1.5 Section 17b NCA – Fixation for the benefit of the disabled 
Section 17b NCA was introduced in the 1995 revision of the NCA. It allows the fixation of 
a published film or picture, with or without sound, and of a transmitted broadcasting 
programme not essentially consisting of musical works, for the purpose of free use by the 
disabled, if covered by a relevant ECL-agreement. The ECL is subject to regulation by the 
King
26
, including the stipulation of which entities that may make use of the ECL. At 
present
27
 no such regulation has been enacted. 
 
2.3.1.6 Section 30 NCA – Broadcast of works 
The ECL for broadcasting of works was, as mentioned above, the first ECL, enacted as 
early as in 1961. Pursuant to this, the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) (and 
other broadcasters, as decided by the King)
28
 may broadcast a published work, if covered 
by a relevant ECL-agreement. The same applies to issued
29
 works of art and issued 
photographic works. 
 
                                                 
26
 In practice the Ministry of Cultural Affairs 
27
 August 2009 
28
 At present (August 2009) no such regulation is enacted 
29
 „Issued‟ implies something less than for a work to be published. Pursuant to section 8(1) NCA, a work is 
issued when it has been „made available to the public‟, cf. the definition of this term in footnote 23. 
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Section 30 is delimited in several respects. Firstly, there is the evident personal limitation: 
For the time being, only NRK is benefited by the provision. Secondly, the ECL is restricted 
to the act of broadcasting of the work, with the further exception of wire-originated 
transmissions
30
 and satellite broadcasting unless it is part of a simultaneous wireless 
transmission by the same broadcaster. Thirdly, stage works and cinematographic works are 
excluded from its scope,
31
 as are fourthly any works opted out by the rights holder. Fifthly, 
apart from works of art and photographic works which only need to be issued
32
, the ECL 
only encompasses published works. Finally, the ECL is restricted to individual payments, 
meaning that no collective schemes pursuant to the prospective ECL-agreements may be 
given extended effect. 
 
The further delimitation of scope is left to the CMO through its fixation of the terms of 
licence. A notable difference between this ECL and the other ECLs, is the requirement of 
individual remuneration and the right to opt out of the scheme. Whilst the remainder leave 
this to the CMOs to decide, thus giving extended effect to [almost] whatever regulation the 
ECL-agreements should have in this respect, section 30 is of a narrower scope. 
 
2.3.1.7 Section 32 NCA – Re-use of self-produced material contained in the 
collections of the broadcasting company. 
Section 32 imposes an ECL on the re-use of the so-called „dead archives‟ of the 
broadcasters. Introduced in 2005, it enables the conclusion of ECL-agreements allowing 
the broadcasters to broadcast anew the productions or to make the productions available in 
„on demand‟ services. 
 
                                                 
30
 Owing to article 11bis of the Berne Convention regulating only wireless transmissions and wire-bound, 
simultaneous transmissions and retransmissions: Thus, with respect to the wire-originated transmissions, 
article 11bis makes no exception from article 11 and 11ter. 
31
 Mainly due to article 14 and 14bis of the Berne Convention. 
32
 Cf. footnote 29. 
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Pursuant to section 32, the productions must be part of the broadcasters own productions, it 
must have been issued (normally it has if it has been broadcasted before), and it must have 
been made before January 1 1997. As with section 30, the rights holder is granted a right to 
opt out. 
 
Curiously, the ECL does comprise cinematographic works, which is surprising, taken into 
consideration articles 14 and 14bis of the Berne Convention, cf. the discussion of the legal 
character of the ECL in subchapter 2.4 below.
33
 
 
2.3.1.8 Section 34 NCA – Cable retransmission 
Pursuant to section 34, works that are lawfully included in a broadcast may, by 
simultaneous and unaltered retransmission, be communicated to the public, if covered by a 
relevant ECL-agreement. In case an ECL agreement is denied or otherwise not concluded 
within six months after the negotiations are initiated, each of the parties may demand that 
permission and terms for retransmission be determined in a binding manner by a special 
commission, cf. section 36(2). 
 
Apart from the possibility for each of the parties to refer the case to a special commission 
with the power to bindingly settle the case,
34
 section 34 differs from the other ECLs in that 
it prescribes ECL as the only possible way to exercise the particular right of retransmission. 
This implies that the author cannot exercise his exclusive right individually in this respect, 
but is forced to exercise it through the CMO. Finally, section 34 excepts wire-originated 
broadcasts from its scope. 
 
                                                 
33
 Ot.prp. nr. 46 (2004-2005) p. 105. See also Rognstad (2004) p. 156, who describes the relation between 
ECL and said provisions as “a still unsolved question” (my translation). 
34
 With respect to the other ECLs, section 38 enables each of the parties to demand mediation, but both 
parties must agree if the dispute is to be settled in a binding manner.  
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2.3.1.9 Sections 36 – 38a NCA 
Sections 36, 37, 38 and 38a regulate certain aspects common for all ECLs.  
 
While the individual ECL-provisions regulate the fields in which ECL-agreements may be 
concluded, plus certain aspects specific to the individual ECLs, section 36(1) regulates and 
delimits the extension-effect of the ECL. 
 
Pursuant to section 36, an ECL-agreement (between an authorised CMO and a user) has the 
effect that the user covered by the agreement may use the works of non-represented authors 
in the same field, in the same way and with respect to the same types of works as covered 
by the ECL-agreement. „In the same field‟ refers to the field of the ECL-provision, 
meaning e.g. reproduction in the educational sector in the case of section 13b etc. „With 
respect to the same types of works‟ implies that the extension effect applies [only] to works 
of the same kind as those covered by the ECL-agreement. A „type of work‟ is however a 
very imprecise term: e.g. both literary works and non-fiction literary works may be seen as 
„types of works‟, the first being much broader than the second. However, this delimitation 
of the extension effect must be seen in connection with the requirement of representativity 
pursuant to section 38a (described below): In order for a CMO to be authorised to conclude 
ECL-agreements, it must be representative for the category/type of works onto which the 
extension effect is to be applied. In other words, the CMO may not conclude ECL-
agreements with respect to categories of works for which it is not representative. If, for 
example, the CMO is representative only for non-fiction literature, and not for literary 
works in general, the ECL will only be extended onto non-fiction literary works. Lastly, „in 
the same way‟ implies that the terms of the ECL-agreement are extended: As long as it 
does not exceed the limits of the individual ECLs, that which is determined concerning the 
use of the works in the ECL-agreement is decisive also for the use of the non-represented 
works. E.g. if the ECL-agreement pursuant to section 14 only allows photocopying for 
purposes of information in the institution, this is decisive also for the use of the non-
represented works. Moreover, pursuant to section 36(1) second sentence it is clearly 
established that the ECL-agreement in its entirety is decisive for the use of the non-
 17 
represented works, meaning that all terms governing the use, duty of reporting the use, 
remuneration for use, etc. must be observed. 
 
Concerning the remuneration for use, section 37(1) determines that the decisions of the 
CMO with respect to the collection and distribution of the remuneration are binding for the 
rights holders to the non-represented works. Pursuant to the second sentence of the 
paragraph, non-member rights holders are all the same to be secured the same access to the 
remuneration as the members, i.e. the distribution formula must be non-discriminatory. 
Section 37(2) modifies this outset to a certain degree by granting the non-member authors a 
right to individual remuneration to the extent that they substantiate the use of their works 
pursuant to the ECL. This will be treated in more detail in subchapter 6.2.7. Furthermore it 
may be kept in mind that section 30 derogates from section 37 by allowing only the 
payment of individual remuneration. 
 
Lastly, all ECLs rely on an authorised CMO
35
 to conclude licence agreements with users. 
In order to obtain authorisation, the CMO must be representative, which pursuant to section 
38a is the case where the CMO, in “the field”, represents a “substantial” part of the authors 
of works used in Norway.  
 
„In the field‟ may refer both to the category of works as well as to the field of the individual 
ECL-provision.
36
 The normal situation is where the CMO represents authors of one or a 
few categories of works, e.g. the Writers Guild of Norway (Dramatikerforbundet) which 
represents some 285 writers for film, television, radio and theatre.
37
 In this , the CMO may 
                                                 
35
 Authorisation is not a requirement in Sweden. 
36
 The term is used somewhat differently in Ot.prp. nr. 15 (1994-1995) pp. 150-151 and Ot.prp. nr. 46 (2004-
2005) pp. 54-56, but a dual sense is in any case meaningful.  
37
 Source: WGN‟s web pages, available at: http://www.dramatiker.no/index.php?name=english 
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be deemed representative for this particular category.
38
 In other cases, as e.g. the case of 
NORWACO which licenses the retransmission right according to section 34 NCA, it is 
more natural to question if the CMO is representative for the authors of works which 
normally are retransmitted this way. Thus, even though a work of a type which would be 
hard to fit into one of the categories represented by NORWACO should find its way into a 
retransmission, the CMO would still be considered representative.
39
 
 
„Substantial part of authors of works used in Norway‟ implies three things. Firstly, 
representativity can only be achieved by representing the original rights holders – the 
authors. Derivative rights holders, such as heirs and publishers do not count with respect to 
the requirement of substantiality.
40
 Secondly, „substantial part‟ implies less than a 
majority:
41
 It suffices to represent a fairly large number of authors of the relevant category 
the closer delineation being subject to an individual assessment where factors such as the 
degree of organisation within the category of works are relevant. Incidentally, it is 
impossible to operate with fixed thresholds, as it is impossible to determine the exact 
number of authors within a given category. The question therefore is whether the CMO 
represents a sufficient number of authors to be representative for the interests of the 
group.
42
 Lastly, the limitation to „works used in Norway‟ implies that it is neither sufficient 
to represent only national authors, nor necessary to represent a substantial number of all 
authors in the world – the key is given by the pattern of use in the relevant market. In all 
probability, pursuant to many ECLs, the predominant part of works used will be of national 
authors. Additionally, the many reciprocity agreements concluded between the different 
CMOs of the world considerably extend representativity beyond the national borders. 
                                                 
38
 What constitutes a „category‟ is not very clear, and will have to be determined partly with regard to the 
CMO which applies for authorisation. Based on the type of authors it represents, this particular configuration 
may be deemed one „category‟, for which it in turn must be examined whether it is representative or not. 
39
 Cf. Ingrid Mauritzen, “Avtalelisenser etter åndsverkloven § 36 – med særlig vekt på de krav som stilles til 
organisasjonen, jf. § 38a”, CompLex, nr. 8/1997, p. 50 ff. 
40
 Cf. Ot.prp. nr. 46 (2004-2005) p. 55 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Cf. NU 1973: 21 p. 84 
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2.3.2 The Danish „omnibus‟-ECL: Section 50(2) DCA 
In 2008 a new section 50(2) was amended to the DCA, introducing the broadest ECL in the 
Nordic countries to date.
43
 Pursuant to this section, the licence agreements of a CMO 
deemed representative for a certain category of works and within a certain specified field 
may be given extended effect onto all the works of this category within this field. In other 
words, section 50(2) imposes a general ECL – a sort of „omnibus‟ ECL that is not restricted 
to certain specified fields, purposes, copyright relevant acts or groups of beneficiaries, as 
are the abovementioned ECLs (which have their equivalents in Denmark as well). 
 
Although undeniably broad, even section 50(2) has certain boundaries. Firstly, section 
50(4) requires that the CMO be authorised by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs to conclude 
such ECL-agreements. The authorisation is to define more closely the fields in which such 
ECL-agreements may be concluded (e.g. the field of digital lending of books, etc. Note that 
„field‟ in this respect is a vague word, giving the Ministry much latitude). Through this 
authorisation, the Ministry is also to control that the CMO fulfils the requirement of 
representativity, namely that it represents a substantial number of works within the 
particular category. Moreover, the Ministry is to see to that authorisation is given only in 
fields where „normal‟ voluntary rights clearance is impractical,44 thus securing that the 
ECL is only used to counter market failure. Secondly, section 50(2) grants the non-member 
authors an unconditional right to opt out of the ECL. 
 
The closer delimitation is left to the relevant CMO. Undeniably, this gives the CMO wide 
margins for determining the terms of licence pursuant to the ECL-agreement. However, 
taken into consideration the need for authorisation, and the relatively wide margins given 
the Ministry when delimiting the scope of the authorisation, in practice the freedom of the 
CMO, and consequently the extent of the ECL, might end up as quite constricted. 
                                                 
43
 Act of June 20 2008 nr. 587. 
44
 Cf. Proposition L 58 of 30.01.2008, comment to section 50(2) and (4). 
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2.4 The legal character of the ECL – is it a limitation? 
In recent years, there has been a shift in the legal perception of the ECL: From initially 
being regarded as a limitation of copyright, possessing common traits with the ordinary 
compulsory licences, the later years have seen an increasing exposure of the rights 
management-aspect of the model. Amongst the indicators of this trend, a shift of 
perspective can be seen in the Scandinavian copyright acts, where the chapters containing 
the ECL-provisions now bear names that accentuate the rights management-perspective.
45
 
This development raises the question of the appropriate legal characterisation of the ECL. 
Is it an outright limitation or is it merely an arrangement concerning rights management?
46
 
 
The fact that ECLs are referred to as „rights management‟ rather than statutory limitations 
is not in itself problematic. For all practical purposes, the ECLs are in fact a means of 
managing collectively the rights of a whole class of authors. And, contrary to outright 
mandatory licences, the ECLs involve an active management, i.e. the terms of use are not 
regulated by rigid, passive legislation, but by agreements negotiated in the free market. 
 
The question, however, becomes relevant when the present trend of regarding such rights 
management as non-conflicting with the exclusive rights structure is taken into 
consideration – in other words that material implications are drawn from the terminological 
divide. For instance, paragraph 18 to the preamble of the Infosoc-directive
47
 states that the 
directive is not to prejudice national arrangements “concerning the management of rights 
such as extended collective licences”. Inasmuch as article 5 of the directive, which is to 
                                                 
45
 Chapter 2 of the DCA and the NCA reads “Limitation of copyright and management of rights by extended 
collective licence”. Chapter 2 to the SCA, which contains the outright limitations, reads “Limitation of 
copyright”, whilst the ECL-provisions are contained in chapter 3 reading “Transfer of rights”. 
46
 See Rognstad (2004) p. 154-155 for a similar discussion that has inspired the present one. 
47
 Directive 2001/29/EC 
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provide for an exhaustive enumeration of permissible limitations,
48
 does not mention any 
ECLs, this might imply that the system of ECL is seen as a special category, different from 
a limitation. Another example is found in French doctrine, which according to Geiger is 
unanimous in treating the mandatory collective management imposed on the reproduction 
right (article L. 122-10 of the French Intellectual Property Code) as separate from the 
compulsory licences.
49
 Geiger furthers this perspective by asserting that the mandatory 
scheme in fact “does not limit existing exclusive rights”.50 This should apply a fortiori to 
the ECLs, considering that the ECLs imply something less than fully mandatory collective 
licensing. 
 
In asserting that such schemes of managing copyright conform to the exclusive rights-
construction of copyright and that they as such do not infringe upon the exclusive right,
51
 it 
seems to have been forgotten that the conventions grant the author (or rights holder) an 
exclusive right to authorise the use of his work. While it might perhaps be argued that the 
exclusive rights-construction in the „acquis communautaire‟ does not include the freedom 
for the author to determine how his rights are to be managed,
52
 it cannot thereby be 
concluded that the same holds true for the rights granted e.g. in the Berne Convention. 
 
                                                 
48
 Recital 32 of the preamble. 
49
 Christophe Geiger, “The role of the three step test in the adaptation of copyright law to the information 
society”, UNESCO Copyright Bulletin, January – March 2007, p. 1-21 (p.11) Online: 
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/34481/11883823381test_trois_etapes_en.pdf/test_trois_etapes_en.pdf 
(last accessed: 13.04.09.) 
50
 Ibid, p. 12. 
51
 Cf. for instance the white paper to the 1995 amendment to the NCA, Ot.prp.nr.15 (1994-1995) p. 69-70. In 
connection with the proposed ECLs for broadcasting (section 30) and retransmission of broadcasts (section 
34) it is commented that recent development in international law has recognised these ECLs as conforming 
with the exclusive rights-structure, and thus not in need of any proviso allowing for compulsory licences. The 
comment is nevertheless only a side remark inasmuch as the necessary conventional basis is found in the BC 
article 11bis. The same tendency can be inferred implicitly from Ot.prp. nr. 46 (2004-2005) which foregoes 
the 2005 amendment to the NCA, on pp. 66-67. 
52
 Cf. recital 18 of the preamble; see chapter 7. 
 22 
Although the ECL in formal terms might be said to uphold the exclusive rights-
construction, in that the users still need authorisation (licence) to be able to use the work 
legally, and in that the CMO is free to choose whether or not to conclude an ECL-
agreement, the author himself is bereft of his exclusive right of authorisation. While the 
authors member to the CMO voluntarily have acceded to the management scheme, and as 
such are exercising their individual right, the outsider authors are forced by legal provision 
to share their right of authorisation. Considering that e.g. the reproduction right in article 
9(1) BC is a personal right – not one granted the body of authors as such – the fact that the 
ECL also can be seen under the angle of rights management cannot change its property of 
limiting copyright, which in turn necessitates compliance with the three-step test of article 
9(2) BC. 
 
It could of course be argued that by providing the possibility to opt out, the ECL only 
presumes that authorisation would have been given, which in case should keep it clear of 
conflict with the exclusive right: In case the presumption should be erroneous, the author 
could just proceed to forbid the use. However, while it could cogently be argued that an 
ECL with this option would sufficiently ensure the interests of the rights holder, it would 
be an untenable claim that this would not be contrary to the exclusive right.
53
 Effectively, 
such a system turns upside down the outset of copyright, namely that it is forbidden to use 
a work unless authorisation is granted by its rights holder. Using contractual presumptions 
(or for that matter considerations based on procedural law
54
) cannot alter this fact if the 
presumption of acceptance verges on a simulation. 
 
                                                 
53
 For a more detailed discussion, see subchapter 6.2.8. 
54
 Which seems to be the case in the Google book settlement which operates on an opt-out basis. Unless 
opting out within September 2009, authors within the Berne Union are bound by the terms of the settlement, 
which include the right for Google to digitally reproduce, make available on demand, and more, of the works 
comprised. Although the settlement (including the opt-out system) builds upon the US system of class action, 
this does not mean that no conflict with the exclusive right may arise. On the contrary: The conventions do 
not require that limitations have a certain form – they ask only if copyright has been limited. 
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Given its mention above, the French system of mandatory collective licence deserves a short 
comment. Regarding Geiger‟s abovementioned statement, it might be argued that it is passable with 
respect to article 9 of the Berne Convention. Contrary to the system of ECL, article L. 122-10 of the 
French IPC provides that an author, by publishing his work, automatically assigns his reproduction 
rights to a collective. It might thus be contended that the author, by voluntarily publishing his work 
when presumptively aware of the automatic transfer of rights thereby entailed, voluntarily exercises 
his exclusive right to this effect. While this might be true in a strictly formal sense, the solution 
nonetheless is functionally equal to a compulsory licence that encompasses published works: For 
many types of works, publishing them is the very consequence of- or a precondition for exploiting 
them. Considering that the exclusive right is granted as a means for the author to exploit his work, and 
that it for this reason is granted the author exclusively, the claim that said rule is conforming to the 
exclusive right amounts to fiction, when in fact the author is only exploiting his work as envisaged. 
 
Accordingly, while both the ECL and the French system might more appropriately be 
referred to as rights management systems, rather than systems of compulsory licensing, this 
terminological and functional difference must not induce one to assuming that no conflict 
with the exclusive right arises. On the contrary, both solutions imply an element of 
coercion, to which the three-step test applies: The inescapable reality is that a work may be 
used pursuant to a will external to that of the author. In response to the question posed 
initially, the answer must be that the ECL is a limitation, although its rights management 
properties might render it less radical than outright compulsory licences (and thus possible 
to impose in fields where compulsory licences surely would be inadmissible). 
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3 Compatibility with the three-step test - introduction 
3.1 Structure 
In the following chapters, the ECL-model is examined in light of the three-step test as 
embodied in the Berne Convention, the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the TRIPS-agreement. 
The model is systematically reviewed in relation to each limb of the test, successively. 
Considering the particular method of interpretation applying to international conventions, a 
short account for the principles used in the following is given in this chapter. Next, the 
conventions incorporating the test are introduced, followed by a general presentation and 
discussion of certain common questions relating to the test. 
 
3.2 Methodology – principles of interpretation 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 regulates, in its Part III Section 3, 
the principles of treaty interpretation. Although the treaty is non-retroactive (article 4), 
entered into force in 1980, and thus strictly speaking does not apply to the Berne 
Convention, its principles on treaty interpretation are considered to be a codification of 
customary international law.
55
 It is thus justifiable to base the subsequent interpretations on 
Section 3 of the convention, keeping in mind that it is not formally binding. With respect to 
the WIPO treaties and the TRIPS (see below), these entered into force after the Vienna 
Convention. However, considering that there is no complete overlap between the states 
                                                 
55
 See e.g. Sam Ricketson and Jane Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Oxford 
2006, p.189 and Martin Senftleben, Copyright limitations and the three-step test, The Hague 2004, p. 99, with 
further references. 
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party to the Vienna Convention and the other treaties, the Vienna Convention is not 
formally binding to the interpretation of these either.
56
 
 
As to the principles codified in the Vienna Convention, article 31(1) establishes the outset: 
The text of the treaty interpreted according to the “ordinary” meaning of the words and the 
context in which they appear, is primary. To the extent that an “object or purpose” can be 
inferred from the treaty, the text will have to be interpreted in light of this as well. Pursuant 
to article 32, if the provisions so interpreted appear ambiguous, obscure or “manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable”, recourse may be had to „supplementary means‟ of interpretation, 
such as preparatory works. 
 
As the act of interpreting is continuous and comprehensive, and normally not something 
that might be split up, the fact that articles 31 and 32 create a hierarchy between primary 
and supplementary means of interpretation needs not imply that the different means must 
be kept apart and be applied in an orderly manner.
57
 On the contrary, read in connection, 
the different means of interpretation might shed light on the meaning of one another: The 
hierarchy is really only relevant when it comes to harmonising the different conclusions 
that can be drawn from the different sources, should they be contrary to one another. If for 
example a side remark in the preparatory works is contrary to the ordinary meaning of the 
text and does not find resonance in the object and purpose of the treaty, it cannot prevail.  
 
Considering the relation between different supplementary means of interpretation, article 
32 does not establish any hierarchy, nor does it provide any explicit limits to what may be 
regarded as such. The explicit mention of preparatory works can nonetheless be taken to 
confirm that these have a central position:
58
 The intimacy between the preparatory works 
and the ensuing instrument can often be substantial, in which case they may be well-suited 
for shedding light on the meaning of the latter. However, the relative weight of the 
                                                 
56
 Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 189. 
57
 In this sense, see Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7
th
 edition, Oxford 2008, p. 632. 
58
 Similarly, Senftleben (2004) p. 111. 
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supplementary means of interpretation must ultimately be determined concretely, with 
regard to the individual accompanying circumstances, see 3.3.1.1 below. 
  
3.3 The three-step test – a general outline 
3.3.1 The conventions in which a three-step test is applied 
3.3.1.1 Berne Convention 
In the field of copyright, the Berne Convention (BC) constitutes the very cornerstone of 
international harmonisation of legal protection. Signed in 1886, it represented the first 
multilateral copyright agreement affording a comprehensive and systematic protection of 
copyright.
59
 Subsequently, the convention has been amended seven times, where both the 
categories of works protected as well as the level of protection, i.e. the acts of use covered, 
have been extended. The latest amendment to the scope of protection was done in the 
Stockholm Act of 1967, where the act of reproduction was given status as exclusive right, 
see below. 
 
The Berne Convention establishes a union (article 1) in which the member states are 
required to treat the works of nationals of other member states in an equal manner to the 
works of its own nationals (article 5). Moreover, pursuant to the same provision, the 
member states are obliged to grant the foreign authors a minimum of protection 
corresponding to the minimum rights stipulated in the convention, even though the level of 
protection granted its own nationals might be lower. These principles of national treatment 
and minimum rights form the backbone of the Berne Convention. The relation to national 
authors, on the other hand, is not subject to regulation. 
 
In the following, only the reproduction right and the limitation to it are to be presented, 
since this is the only instance where the three-step test applies in the BC. 
 
                                                 
59
 Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 42. 
 27 
Article 9(1) BC grants the authors of artistic and literary works “the exclusive right of 
authorizing the reproduction of these works, in any manner or form”. This rule is however 
subject to a proviso in subsection (2) giving signatory states the ability to make exceptions 
to this right. Subsection (2) also limits the scope of the exceptions that can be made with 
the wording: 
 
“It shall be a matter for the legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such 
works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author”. 
 
The most prominent construction of this limit of scope is known as the three-step-test, and 
is a linguistic deconstruction of the aforementioned wording into the three following 
criteria: 
1. Any exception must be limited to “certain special cases”.  
2. An exception must not allow reproduction that “conflict[s] with a normal 
exploitation of the work”. 
3. An exception must not “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
author”. 
 
The three-step test appeared for the first time in the Stockholm text of the Berne 
Convention, and was carried on to the Paris text of 1971. It was introduced along with the 
protection of the reproduction right, acknowledging the impossibility of an unlimited right 
of reproduction.
60
 Since its first appearance, the test has later on been adopted in the WTO 
TRIPS agreement, in the WIPO Conventions of 1996 and in EC law, with only slight 
alterations of wording. 
 
Considering the apparent vagueness of the three-step test, it can be anticipated here that the 
preparatory works to the Stockholm Act de facto have a proportionately greater importance 
                                                 
60
 World Intellectual Property Organisation, Records of the intellectual property conference of Stockholm 
(1967), Geneva 1971, p. 111 
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to the interpretation, although being a supplementary means of interpretation. Moreover, 
the general significance of preparatory works already having been discussed, it may here be 
noted that the Records are detailed, seemingly precise and readily available, which could 
justify putting strong emphasis on the arguments thus derived. The preparatory history 
leading to the adoption of the three-step test is accounted for in detail, the records 
providing all the relevant documents and transcripts, spanning from the preparatory 
documents to the Conference (S/1) to the debates of the Main Committee I, which was 
entrusted with considering the proposal for revising the substantive provisions of the BC. 
These arguably shed light on the object and purpose of the regulation, as does the report of 
the Main Committee I, in which the work of the committee is accounted for in detail, 
including the interpretations on which it based its deliberations. 
 
3.3.1.2 WIPO treaties 
1996 saw the adoption of two new treaties concerning copyright and neighbouring rights, 
namely the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (WPPT). These were the products of the WIPO Diplomatic Conference on Certain 
Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Questions, convened for the need of new international 
instruments on copyright capable of handling the challenges brought by the “economic, 
social, cultural and technological developments”61 since the last amendment to the Berne 
Convention in 1971.
62
 
 
Especially the technical evolution necessitated a new regulation. Whilst the BC protected 
both the reproduction right (article 9), and certain acts of communication to the public 
(wireless broadcasting in article 11bis, wire-bound communication to the public of 
cinematographic works and works thus adapted in articles 14 and 14bis, any 
communication to the public of performances and recitations of works in articles 11 ad 
11ter respectively), and whilst these rights still are of importance in the technical reality of 
                                                 
61
 Preamble to the WCT and WPPT 
62
 Cf. Senftleben (2004), p. 91. 
 29 
today, the patterns of use brought about by the „digital age‟ were not effectively addressed 
by the provisions of the BC. For instance, the act of making a protected work available to 
the public through digital on-demand service, which is inherent to the Internet, is of such a 
distinctive nature that it calls for a separate regulation. There was also substantial 
uncertainty as to the status of „digital copying‟ under the Berne Convention: Although 
certain forms of digital copying probably would fall within the term „reproduction‟ as 
regulated in article 9 BC, the status of for instance transient copying and storage (e.g. in the 
RAM of the computer) was not evident.
63
 Furthermore, the adoption of new instruments 
would provide the opportunity of homogenizing certain rights that were rather 
heterogeneously treated in the BC, i.e. the right of communication to the public
64
. 
 
As with the Berne Convention, the WIPO treaties acknowledge the need for limitations to 
the outset of exclusivity. Similar to the system of the BC, articles 10(1) and 16(2) in the 
WTC and WPPT respectively, subject the protected rights to a proviso granting the 
signatory states the power to impose exceptions and limitations. The scope of this authority 
is in turn limited by a three-step test identical to that of the BC, with only negligible 
differences in wording. (Concerning the possibly different interpretations of the individual 
three-step tests, se subsection 3.3.2 below). In addition, article 10(2) WCT introduces a 
separate, identical three-step test on limitations to the minimum rights of the Berne 
Convention.  
 
Although the WCT is a treaty of its own, it defines itself a “special agreement within the 
meaning of Article 20 of the Berne Convention” and proceeds to incorporate articles 1 to 
21 and the appendix of the Paris Act of the BC into the scope of obligations (article 1(1), 
(3) and (4)). Consequently, the signatory states are obliged to comply with the substantive 
provisions of the BC, although not bound by the latter. By the imposition of the three-step 
                                                 
63
 See the account in Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 682 ff. 
64
 Which in the WCT is given general application, both with respect to the works covered as well as with 
respect to the different modes of such communication: wireless, by wire and on demand transmission. 
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test pursuant to article 10(2), the signatory states are consequently required to subject all 
limitations to the BC to the scrutiny of the test. 
 
The effect of this extended applicability of the three-step test is nonetheless rendered 
uncertain by a unanimously agreed 
65
 statement on the interpretation of article 10 by the 
Conference when adopting the treaty. In the second paragraph of the statement, article 
10(2) is affirmed to neither reduce nor extend the “scope of applicability” of the limitations 
and exceptions permitted by the BC. According to the principles of the Vienna Treaty, such 
agreements made between all the parties are to be part of the context in which the terms of 
the treaty are interpreted (article 31(2)(a)). It thus appears that the provision is less of an 
imperative than a recommendation: Limitations to the Berne Convention are not required 
to conform with the three-step test of the WCT if they otherwise are permissible according 
to the provisions of the BC.
66
 
 
The said agreed statement is nevertheless not exhausted by the above. According to the first 
paragraph of the statement, the three-step test of article 10(1) is understood to permit the 
continuation and extension into the digital environment of national exceptions and 
limitations that conform to the Berne Convention. Furthermore, it is understood to permit 
the introduction of new limitations that are appropriate in the digital network environment. 
Considering the interpretation of the three-step test, the WCT (and the WPPT which is 
accompanied by an agreed statement incorporating the abovementioned statement mutatis 
mutandis) is thus equipped with an interpretation tool not available to the test of the BC. As 
to its significance, see subsection 3.3.2 below. 
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 Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 870 
66
 In the same direction, see Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 871 
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3.3.1.3 TRIPS-agreement 
In the Marrakesh Agreement of 1994 establishing the World Trade Organisation, there was 
annexed a number of agreements, among which the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
 
The copyright-specific regulation of the TRIPS-agreement is contained in articles 9-14. 
Apart from incorporating the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention (article 9), the 
agreement affords computer programs protection as literary works under the BC (article 
10), introduces a lending right for computer programs and cinematographic works (article 
11) and extends the term of protection in cases where the calculation is done on other basis 
than the life of a natural person (article 12). 
 
Pursuant to article 13 the signatory states are obliged to bring all limitations to the 
exclusive rights protected by the TRIPS in conformity with the requirements of a three-step 
test similar to the above-mentioned tests. Article 13 is different, however, in that it 
demands an assessment of the prejudice caused to the rights holder, as opposed to the 
above three-step tests where the author is in focus. “Right holder” is in this sense a broader 
term, since it also includes derivative rights holders, e.g. heirs. Furthermore, article 6bis BC 
which grants the authors moral rights is explicitly excepted from the incorporation of the 
substantive provisions of BC into TRIPS (article9). Thus, it would appear that the 
„legitimate interests‟ of the rights holders pursuant to article 13 do not include moral rights. 
This, however, seems to be the case with the two above-mentioned tests.
67
 
 
An important question is how the three-step test of the TRIPS relates to the exclusionary 
provisions of the BC. Article 13 TRIPS declares that member states shall confine 
limitations to “exclusive rights” to cases in conformity with the three-step test. The 
indefinite reference to “exclusive rights” might at first sight appear to require that the 
member states bring all limitations in conformity with the three-step test. This can however 
                                                 
67
 Senftleben (2004) p. 224-225. 
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not be the case, as it would be utter meaningless to require of the member states that they 
restrict their limitations on rights that the convention does not even require to be protected. 
A common interpretation, on the other hand, which accords well with the indefinite 
reference to “exclusive rights” in general, is that in addition to serving as authority for 
imposing limitations with respect to the rights afforded „first‟ protection in the TRIPS, it 
also applies as a limitation of scope to the exclusionary provisions of the BC which is 
included in the obligations of the TRIPS by reference.
68
 As to the closer question of how it 
relates to the individual provisions of the BC, I will limit myself to referring to the 
extensive literature on the topic.
69
 For the purposes of the present thesis, it suffices to point 
out that articles 10(2) and 11bis(2) BC which, as mentioned introductorily, are of relevance 
to the ECL, might thus be subject to the three-step test of the TRIPS. Certain authors all the 
same suggest that the extensive nature of the limitation in 11bis(2) entails that the three-
step test is not to be applied.
70
 Concerning article 9 BC as incorporated in the TRIPS, the 
differences accounted for above between the three-step tests of the BC and the TRIPS 
respectively, implies that when limitations must comply with both, the additional test of the 
TRIPS might imply a further restriction, see also the discussion of the relation between the 
three three-step tests in subchapter 3.3.2 below. 
 
An important feature of the TRIPS-agreement, absent in the two above-mentioned treaties, 
is the possibility of unilaterally requiring binding dispute settlement (article 64(1) TRIPS) 
This implies that the conformity of national limitations to the requirements of the three-step 
test may in fact be subjected to binding decision by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of 
the WTO.  
 
Pertaining to the status of such panel reports as sources of interpretation, they may hardly 
be invoked as more than a supplementary means of interpretation.
71
 Nonetheless, and as 
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 E.g. Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 855-856; Senftleben (2004) p. 90. 
69
 E.g. Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 855 ff; Senftleben (2004) p. 87 ff. 
70
 Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 859-860. 
71
 Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 200; Senflteben (2004) p. 110. 
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pointed out by many commentators, panel reports adopted by the DSB must be given a 
certain weight.
72
 The reports are often thorough, and as pointed out by Senftleben, they are 
a result of the participation – if indirect – of the member states of the WTO.73 Compared to 
other supplementary means of interpretation, such as national court decisions, the panel 
reports arguably are of superior weight. Pertaining specifically to article 13 TRIPS, the near 
vacuum of sources on the interpretation of the three-step test might also contribute to an 
increased weight de facto being put on the panel report. 
 
3.3.1.4 Directive 2001/29/EC 
Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society will be treated separately in chapter 4. It is however in this 
context noteworthy that pursuant to article 5(5), the member states are obliged to ensure 
that any implementation of the limitations provided for in articles 5(1)-(4) of the directive 
into national legislation must conform to the requirements of the three-step test. 
 
Per recital 44 of the preamble of the directive, the directive is intended to bring the 
community into compliance with certain international obligations relating to the subject 
matter of the directive; of particular relevance here is the three-step test as implemented in 
the WCT. The implementation of the directive into the domestic legislation of a member 
state must accordingly include an incarnation of the three-step test which is no more 
permissive than the implementation of the same test in the WCT, in order to allow the EC 
as a whole to comply with the WCT. 
 
Whether the directive itself imposes a stricter test than the WCT and whether the member-
states are free to implement a less permissive test will not be considered and I will for the 
present purposes proceed on the assumption that the tests are identical. 
 
                                                 
72
 E.g. Senflteben (2004) p. 110; Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 201. 
73
 Senftleben (2004) p. 110. 
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3.3.2 Is it possible to operate with a common interpretation of the three-step test? 
The different three-step tests appear in different contexts. While they share the common 
purpose of limiting the scope of exceptions to the exclusive rights, the treaties in which 
they are embodied are separate legal instruments requiring a separate interpretation. 
 
For instance, the TRIPS-agreement explicitly excludes the moral rights pursuant to article 
6bis BC from its scope of protection. This implies that the provision does not form part of 
the context in which the three-step test of the TRIPS is to be interpreted. In turn, this would 
indicate that the “legitimate interests of the rights holder” referred to in the third step do not 
include these moral rights. A limitation encroaching upon e.g. the right to be named
74
 does 
consequently not need to justify this particular prejudice to the interest of the author. The 
three-step test of the BC, however, where article 6bis undoubtedly forms part of the 
context, could very well lead to a different result. 
 
Furthermore, being a trade agreement, the TRIPS may promote objectives other than those 
of the Berne Convention and the WCT, which might give rise to differences in 
interpretation.
75
  
 
A third example is the agreed statement to article 10 WCT. As mentioned, such statements 
form part of the interpretative context of the treaty. As the agreed statement is specific to 
the WCT only, it cannot be used in the same way when interpreting the BC and the TRIPS, 
which incidentally are older instruments than the WCT. 
 
The exemplification shows that there are relevant differences that, apart from the fact that 
they formally are independent instruments, indicate that the application of the three-step 
test may become different in practice. 
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Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006), p. 600-601. 
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 Cf. Ricketson/Ginsbug (2006), p. 852-853 
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On the other hand, as pointed out by Senftleben, the incorporation by reference of the 
substantive provisions of the BC which is made both in the WCT and the TRIPS-
agreement, ensures a high degree of common context for the interpretation of the three 
different tests.
76
 
 
With respect to the interpretational value of the agreed statement to article 10 WCT, the 
fact that it was adopted by a substantial number of the states signatory to the TRIPS-
agreement,
77
 implies that it may be taken into consideration when interpreting the TRIPS:
78
 
While a complete overlap would be necessary if the statement were to be a primary source 
of interpretation pursuant to article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention, it nonetheless 
would appear qualified as a supplementary means of interpretation pursuant to article 32.
79
 
(Incidentally, the same could be said for the very three-step test of the WCT). 
 
Evidently, there is a difference between serving as primary means of interpretation to one 
convention whilst only as a supplementary one to the other. For example with respect to the 
agreed statement to article 10(2) WCT, which arguably is at odds with the scope of 
application of the three-step test as inferred from the wording of both the TRIPS and the 
WCT, such difference is indeed of relevance.  
 
However, when having regard to the all-but-identical wording of the three-step tests, the 
high degree of coincident context and their ability to serve as interpretative backgrounds 
for each other respectively, it seems reasonable to use a shared interpretation of all treaties 
and only where warranted from the context deviate from this approach. 
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 Senftleben (2004) p. 106. This only applies to the younger instruments, however, since they incorporate the 
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3.3.3 A review of the system of three steps 
Traditionally, the three steps of the test have been perceived as separate, cumulative 
hurdles that must be applied in the order in which they appear. Thus, a limitation on the 
exclusive right must pass each limb successfully; a failure to meet the conditions of any of 
the steps would render the limitation inadmissible.
80
 The interpretation seems to rest on a 
linguistic analysis, more precisely on a structural analysis of the wording of the respective 
provisions: A limitation may be imposed “in certain special cases, provided that [criterion 
2]…and [criterion 3]”81, “in certain special cases that [criterion 2]…and [criterion 3]”82 
and finally “in certain special cases which [criterion 2]…and [criterion 3]”83 (emphasis 
added).  
 
The preparatory history of the Stockholm Act might lend support to this interpretation: In 
the initial proposition, the third step appeared before the second, but this was reversed by 
the Main Committee I as it would “afford a more logical order for the interpretation of the 
rule”.84 Subsequently, the committee gives the following explanation to the logic of the 
reversal: 
 
“If it is considered that reproduction conflicts with the normal exploitation of the work, reproduction is 
not permitted at all. If it is considered that reproduction does not conflict with the normal exploitation 
of the work, the next step would be to consider whether it does not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author. Only if such is not the case would it be possible in certain special 
cases to introduce a compulsory licence, or to provide for use without payment.”85 
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 Cf. Silke von Lewinski, International copyright law and policy, Oxford 2008, p. 160; Ricketson/Ginsburg 
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Lately there has been some debate as to the relation between these three steps. In 2008, the 
Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law was 
issued, in which – as the title reveals – a balanced interpretation of the three-step test was 
proposed.
86
 The Declaration, signed by a large number of legal experts, affirms that the 
three-step test is not to be interpreted in the traditional, restricted manner. Instead, it is seen 
to call for a “comprehensive overall assessment rather than the step-by-step application that 
its usual…description implies. No single step is to be prioritised”.87 
 
First of all, the formulation of the test does not prescribe the traditional interpretation. The 
wording – “provided that” – indicates a cumulative application of the steps. That it should 
require separate assessment of each step, on the other hand, i.e. that they be independent, 
absolute hurdles, is but one possible interpretation.  
 
To be sure, the very existence of the second step might be taken in support of this 
interpretation: If a provision deprives the author of the ability to exercise a normal 
exploitation of his work, it normally prejudices his interests. Thus, the third step would 
have been sufficient if the aim were to ensure that such economic regards could be taken 
into consideration. When the second step in spite of this has been included in the test, an 
obvious conclusion would be that the step is an independent hurdle that the limitation must 
pass, and that it consequently is not subject to the balancing of interests inherent to the third 
step. The exemplification of the Main Committee I tends to bear out this interpretation as 
well. 
 
All the same, a different perspective on the explicit inclusion of the second step is that it 
can be seen as a directive for which considerations that must be included in the assessment 
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of the limitation, but without imposing any obligation to let disharmony in this respect, be 
decisive. Although this harmonises poorly with the example of the Main Committee I, it 
seems on the other hand to be in line with the purposes of the instruments incorporating the 
three-step test. 
 
As demonstrated in the Declaration, a balancing of interests between the authors and the 
public is inherent to the conventions on copyright protection.
88
 For instance, the preamble 
to the WCT stresses “the need to maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the 
larger public interest, particularly education, research and access to information”, whilst 
article 8 TRIPS allows member states to “adopt measures necessary…to promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development”. Considering that this forms the context in which the three-step tests are to 
be interpreted, a balanced interpretation where the steps are considered “together and as a 
whole in a comprehensive assessment”89 appears better founded than the strict, orderly 
application.
90
 If each step were to be given such decisive influence on the outcome, the said 
balance of interests could suffer, as will be pointed out more clearly in the subsequent 
interpretation of the individual steps. As a curiosity it can be noted that there seems to be a 
tendency amongst legal scholars who propose the „traditional‟ interpretation to focus on the 
normative elements of the first two steps (see below). If interpreted in the traditional way 
this is understandable, since „safety valves‟ taking into consideration the necessity of 
imposing a limitation would be necessary in order to prevent that „purely‟ quantitative 
thresholds become absolutely decisive. On the other hand, such „veiled‟ balancing of 
interests in each step would seem rather counterproductive, as well as add uncertainty to 
which normative regards (which interests) to include where. 
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 The BC is however not this explicit in recognising the competing interests, making the „modern‟ 
interpretation somewhat more doubtful with respect to this instrument. The consequences to the following 
discussion are nonetheless few, see the last paragraph of this discussion. 
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Arguments that the three-step test would become ineffective in ensuring that limitations on 
the level of protection do not become too extensive, if this relative interpretation were 
adopted, of course carry some weight. Nonetheless, adopting the „modern‟ interpretation 
does not deprive the test of its regulatory capacity: Interpreting it as not providing three 
independent, absolute hurdles, does not entail it being a carte blanche to impose any 
conceivable limitation. The three steps still indicate quite clearly which regards are relevant 
in the assessment to be done, but the modern interpretation allows for a more flexible 
approach, that is better suited to adapt to the ever-changing patterns within copyright 
utilisation and societal needs.  
 
In any case, how the system of three steps is to be interpreted is not cardinal to the 
discussion in the following. Systematically, the discussion is divided into three parts where 
each step is treated separately. Thus, the requirements of the individual steps – whether 
they be absolute or not – are given due consideration, and the traits of the ECL relevant to 
the individual steps are highlighted. The relevant differences arise where the compliance 
with the first two steps is dubious. As will be seen, the ECL is not unquestionable in this 
respect. In this case, the question is whether limitations that emerge as „reasonable‟ from 
the comprehensive test of the third step, which has taken into due consideration the 
requirements of the first two steps, pass the three-step test as such. Although I tend to see 
this interpretation as having reasonable support, reaching a different conclusion does not 
deprive the following of meaning or interest, as the different parts, although connected, 
speak for themselves. 
 
3.4 Is it possible to assess the ECL-model as such? 
The ECL-model is heterogeneous. This naturally complicates the assessment of the model, 
since its different modes might give rise to differences in judgement. Moreover, the reasons 
for imposing an ECL – the normative justification for wishing to rectify market failure in a 
particular market – are various, as are the uses that it might be set to regulate. All ECLs 
share a common core, however. In the following, only a material consideration of certain 
particular ECL-provisions will be presented, in view of later abstraction of the results. 
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Where differences in judgement might arise, the different modes of the ECL-model will be 
discussed explicitly. This method should allow an impression of the compatibility of the 
model with the three-step test. 
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4 Step one: Certain special cases 
4.1 General interpretation 
4.1.1 Introduction 
Although a superficial reading of the phrase indicates a constriction of scope, it is not 
possible to conclusively determine what the words “certain special cases” mean from the 
wording alone. 
 
“Certain”91 somehow indicates that the limitation must be particularised. Some legal 
scholars claim it requires a high degree of precision in that the scope of the limitations must 
be clearly defined.
92
 One could also ask whether it only implies that limitations in 
accordance with the test are a particularised mass of provisions. Likewise, “special”93 
connotes a number of significations: It can for instance refer to the exceptional character of 
a case, its distinctiveness from other cases, or its limited character.  
 
Accordingly, various legal scholars have constructed the first step in a number of ways, 
including both as a quantitative test and a qualitative test.
94
 Others have understood it to 
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require a high degree of precision. Some have used the records of the Stockholm 
Conference as a basis for their interpretations, whereas yet others have relied on structural 
and teleological considerations. In the following, I will present these different approaches 
before continuing to evaluate the ECL-model in light of the first step. 
 
4.1.2 The quantitative approach 
Construed as a quantitative test, the notion of “certain special cases”, more precisely its 
connotation of “limited application”95, is taken to imply that the limitation (“cases”) must 
be of a limited character in that it must be “narrow in its scope and reach”.96 In what sense 
the limitation must be narrow as well as what aspects would need to be of such a scope, is 
less evident.  
 
The notion of narrowness inevitably hints at some sort of numerical assessment. In other 
words that there is a numerical limit to what the signatory states may exclude from the 
author‟s sphere of control by means of one, single limitation. There are however many 
ways of quantifying such a limit.  
 
For instance, such a limit could be constructed as a ratio. This seems to have been the 
approach of the WTO Panel in its report on Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act. 
Pursuant to the said section, certain establishments up to a certain size in square feet could 
communicate radio or television broadcasts of musical works to the public on their 
premises free of charge. When determining whether this was a “certain special case” in a 
quantitative sense, the panel inquired into the ratio between businesses falling within the 
size limit and businesses too large to be included.
97
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 WTO (2000) paragraphs 6.118-6.126 
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The limit could also be constructed as a non-relative maximal number. This interpretation 
is however to be rejected at once, as nothing in the wording nor in the preparatory history 
suggests that there is in fact such an absolute limit, not to mention the lack of any guidance 
on how to fix this limit. 
 
Furthermore, one must ask what aspects of copyright are to be quantified. Is it the number 
of users who would benefit from the exception? Or the number of protected acts permitted 
under the limitation, e.g. the number of individual reproductions? Or the number of 
different rights being limited, e.g. the right of reproduction and the right of broadcasting 
being excluded pursuant to the same provision? Or perhaps the number of purposes of use 
that are covered by one and the same limitation, e.g. if reproduction for judicial, private and 
educational purposes were permitted by virtue of the same provision? 
 
It may be argued that a purely quantitative threshold is unsuitable. As will have appeared, it 
is not clear which factors are to be quantified (and which consequently would need to be 
narrow in scope). If not careful, however, a purely quantitative assessment could prove 
devastating to otherwise sensible limitations underpinned by important policy 
considerations (this is of course the case only in the traditional interpretation of the system 
of three steps, see 3.3.3). For instance, it would be difficult to claim that the transient or 
incidental reproduction that happens in computers every day during the course of their 
normal operation is narrow in quantity. Nonetheless, a prohibition against a limitation 
allowing such use would be devastating to the modern, digital society. A solution could of 
course be to assess the quantitative extent in relation to uses that are of economic 
importance to the rights holder: Controlling, and thus profiting on such transient copying 
would probably be very difficult. However, this would anticipate the test of the second 
step. In general, it is not evident how this quantitative limit – the “narrow scope” – is to be 
assessed. 
 
All in all, it can be questioned whether operating with a quantitative limit is a correct 
interpretation of the first step. The solution seems to give rise to more questions than it 
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solves. Furthermore, a purely quantitative assessment which determines the admissibility of 
a limitation without having taken into account the importance of the underlying policy 
considerations could, as seen in the case of transient reproduction, be devastating. 
Moreover, as persuasively argued by Gervais, there is no logical necessity in the 
connotation of “limited…application”98 being translated into narrowness in scope.99 On the 
contrary, there is a “huge logical jump”100 between the two. Whilst it in the traditional 
understanding of the test would be paramount to determine appropriately a possible 
threshold, this nonetheless is less important in the modern approach to the test. Since the 
individual steps do not form independent hurdles, but are subject to a conclusive, overall 
assessment, the very notion of a limit is alien. On the other hand, the process of 
determining in rough terms the extensiveness of an exception still would be of interest, as it 
can be posited that the broader the limitation, the worthier must [usually] the policy 
objectives which underlie the limitation be in order to see the limitation through the final 
balancing of interests. The first step forms an appropriate framework around this 
assessment.  
 
4.1.3 The qualitative approach  
Constructed as a qualitative test, the term “certain special cases” is understood to call for a 
scrutiny of the purposes underlying the limitation rather than an assessment of its numerical 
extent. It is especially the word “special” connoting “[of] exceptional…distinguishing 
qualities”101 that has fuelled this interpretation. 
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According to the view of Ricketson, which in large has been built upon by other 
commentators,
102
 there must be “something „special‟ about the purpose of the limitation, 
„special‟ here meaning that it is justified by some clear reason of public policy or some 
other exceptional circumstance” (emphasis added).103 Further elaborated by Senftleben, a 
“sufficiently strong justification must be given for a limitation”.104 The latter hints at a 
relative assessment, where the justification must be stronger, i.e. the policy objectives must 
be more „worthy‟, the more extensive the limitation. 
 
Whether it serves as an additional hurdle to the above quantitative test, or whether as the 
only test of the first step, a qualitative test in the first step seems superfluous when 
considering the test of the third step. This last step calls for a balancing of interests between 
the author‟s interests in protection and society‟s interest in imposing a limitation, see 
chapter 6 below. Thus, some form of policy consideration would have to justify the 
limitation in order not to unreasonably prejudice the interests of the author. And, as will be 
seen below, this balancing of interests clearly calls for a relative assessment: The more the 
interests of the author are prejudiced, the more worthy must the policy objectives be. To 
repeat such a proportionality test in the first step does not seem advisable.
105
 
 
It could of course be argued that the first step would represent something new to the test 
already embodied in the third step, if it were to assess the qualitative aspects in a non-
relative manner. However, the term „certain special cases‟ gives no clue as to what this 
qualitative threshold would consist of, and, as submitted by Ricketson/Ginsburg (the 
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former of which now has abandoned the view expressed in the former edition of his book) 
nothing in the preparatory history of the test in the BC suggests such a lower qualitative 
threshold – rather the contrary.106 
 
In the modern view of the test, the question of qualitative justification does not need to be 
incorporated in the test of the first step. The third step (as well as certain parts of the second 
step, see below) forms a sufficient framework around the review of the qualitative aspects 
of a limitation. This aspect is thus not further explored in this subsection, the qualitative 
assessment being deferred to the third step instead. 
 
4.1.4 The notion of “certainty” as a requirement of legal precision 
Adding to the requirement of limitedness in scope, the first step has been constructed so as 
to require that the limitation is formulated in precise terms – that it be “clearly defined”107 
as it is put by the WTO Panel in the “Homestyle”-case. While some legal scholars have 
adopted this view,
108
 others oppose the need for such clear definitions arguing instead that 
different national limitations only need to be discernable from each other.
109
 Yet others 
argue that the first step only requires the limitation to be of a “reasonably foreseeable” 
scope.
110
 
 
Against the need for clearly defined limitations, Senftleben argues that such an 
interpretation would be an unfounded preference of the positivistic civil law approach to 
formulating legal norms.
111
 The more open-ended approach of the common law system, 
where necessary adjustments to a higher degree are left the courts to perform, would suffer 
                                                 
106
 Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) pp. 766-767. 
107
 WTO (2000) paragraph 6.108. 
108
 E.g. Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 764; Lewinski (2008) p. 161. 
109
 Senftleben (2004) p. 135. 
110
 Geiger, Griffiths, Hilty (2008) p. 711. 
111
 Senftleben (2004) p. 135 
 47 
under such an interpretation.
112
 Indeed, there seems to be little support in the wording, the 
context or the preparatory works for such an interpretation. 
 
Nonetheless, the requirement of certainty undeniably connotes foreseeability to some 
degree, and it would be easy to agree that utterly shapeless provisions that are 
indeterminable in scope and justification might fail to be a certain case. As was 
contemplated in the first draft text of article 9(2) BC prepared by the Study Group
113
 
“exceptions should only be made for clearly specified purposes…exceptions for no 
specified purpose, on the other hand, are not permitted”.114 Although the draft text to which 
the comment was made did not make its way into the final text of the article, it nonetheless 
has persuasive qualities. Requiring that the „borderlines‟ of the limitation are at least 
reasonably clear would both increase the foreseeability for the users and authors as well as 
ensure that the legislator has thought through the implications of the proposed limitation, 
“including such matters as the right(s) and works covered, the persons who may take 
advantage of it, and the purpose of the exception”.115 Considering the tests of the ensuing 
steps, a reasonable degree of clarity with respect to the scope of the limitation would 
furthermore be of key importance. 
 
It is thus submitted that the first step indeed does require a reasonable degree of clarity and 
foreseeability. This does not mean that open-ended limitations necessarily are disqualified: 
According to the overall approach, a comprehensive evaluation of the limitation must be 
conducted. Nonetheless, the lesser degree of clarity, the less probable that the limitation 
survives the scrutiny of the test, seen as a whole. 
 
                                                 
112
 E.g. the „fair use‟ defence pursuant to section 107 of the US Copyright Act. 
113
 Cf. Records (1967) p. 75 for a description of its composition.  
114
 Ibid. p. 112. 
115
 Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 764 
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4.2 The system of ECL  
4.2.1 Introduction 
Considering the nature of the requirements of the first step, an inquiry into the compliance 
with the criteria of each individual ECL-provision is of course preferable. That way the 
extensiveness of the different provisions that come under the common abstraction of the 
ECL-model can be determined in empiric terms. In the following, the quantitative aspect of 
a few, representative ECLs will be assessed, before a more general assessment of the ECL-
model is conducted conclusively. 
 
4.2.2 A review of certain specific provisions 
As concluded above, the first step measures the width of scope as well as the precision of 
the limitation. A very broad scope could indicate a conflict with the first step, but as 
already seen, this is not necessarily so, e.g. in the case of transient copying. In the 
following, I will run the ECLs through the test of the first step, exemplifying with the two 
„reproduction‟-ECLs, namely sections 13b and 14 NCA, and the „omnibus‟-ECL of section 
50(2) DCA. 
 
Sections 13b and 14 NCA 
In order to measure the scope of the said provisions, the aspects that are to be quantified 
must be determined. This question was touched upon above, although in a slightly different 
connection, namely the question of whether the first step operates with a fixed limit – a 
threshold – or not. One way of forming a framework for the subsequent review of sections 
13b and 14 is to ask: Who can make what use of which types of works to which extent and 
for what purposes. In other words, which users may benefit from the exception, which 
categories of works may they use, which acts of use are permitted, how intensely can they 
use the works, and what purpose must the use have. 
 
The group of users benefiting from the exception in section 14 is large: Public and private 
institutions, organisations and commercial enterprises form a very large group of copyright 
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„consumers‟, while “educational activities” (section 13b) arguably is much narrower. 
Furthermore, except for a small exception for the fixation of certain broadcast works, there 
is no limitation as to the categories of works that may be used pursuant to either section. 
The only requirement is that the work must be published. As for the uses covered, the 
ECLs allows for reproduction for “use within own activities” (section 14) and “use within 
own educational activities” (section 13b). The subsequent use of the reproduction thus 
made is only limited by the purpose of “use within own [educational] activities”, meaning 
that other copyright relevant uses are permitted as well, e.g. remote education pursuant to 
section 13b and distribution in the intranet pursuant to section 14, which arguably falls 
within the act of communication to the public.
116
 Both analogue and digital reproduction is 
permitted. Furthermore, the provisions set few limits to the extent of the reproduction (the 
intensity of use): The outer limit is that of copying activities similar to those normally 
undertaken by a publisher.
117
 ECL-agreements allowing such copying may, for this part, 
not be given extended effect. Apart from this, the closer determination of the copying 
volume is left to the individual agreements. Finally, the most significant constriction of 
scope is found in the required purpose of use. The reproduction may only be done for the 
said “use within own [educational] activities”. This excludes external distribution, 
communication to- and making available to externals of the reproductions, e.g. copying for 
use in sales prospects.
118
 With respect to section 13b, the restriction to educational 
activities implies that only the copying with the purpose of serving for education is covered 
by section 13b. Copying for other uses, such as administrative use would have to be done 
pursuant to section 14. 
 
The account shows that both ECLs are extensive. While rather foreseeable in scope – the 
terms of the provisions are not very vague – this nonetheless clearly not implying 
narrowness. Interestingly, when these ECLs initially were proposed by the Holmøy 
                                                 
116
 As protected e.g. by article 8 WCT. For a discussion of the term “the public”, see e.g. Ricketson/Ginsburg 
pp. 704-705. 
117
 See 2.3.1.3.  
118
 Cf. Ot.prp.nr.15 (1994-1995) p. 114. 
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Committee in the late 1980s, the committee considered the compliance with the first step to 
be dubious, due to their very extensive nature.
119
 To exemplify in terms of numbers, the 
statistics of the period 2004-2005 which are used to calculate the payments under the said 
ECLs shows an average of 824 pages of protected material copied per person in the 
university/college-sector. This corresponds to a yearly volume of 195M copies of copyright 
protected pages out of a total of 467M pages.
120
 In 2007, this yielded revenues of MNOK 
68,1.
121
 Considering that these figures only represent a share of the copying conducted 
pursuant to the said ECLs, this should give a rough idea of their scope.
 
 
Section 50(2) DCA 
Lastly, section 50(2) DCA can be called on for comparison: At first sight section 50(2) 
appears nearly limitless, in that none of the abovementioned criteria for establishing the 
scope of a limitation are defined. It does not define a circle of beneficiaries nor does it limit 
its field of operation to any particular categories of works. It is open with respect to forms 
of use, and it does not set a maximum to the intensity of use. Finally, there is no restriction 
to any particular purpose of use. The only apparent limitation is the need for an ECL-
agreement onto which it may be applied, which in turn requires the contracting CMO to be 
representative and authorised. This is however of key importance: As will be seen in the 
subsequent chapter, the ECLs possess certain common properties that are of central 
relevance when assessing their scope qua limitations. 
 
                                                 
119
 NOU 1988: 22 p. 24. However, this assessment related only to the first step, and did not hinder the 
committee from concluding that the ECLs were in accordance with article 9(2) BC in general terms. It is 
noteworthy that the discussion related to the question of whether Norway should accede to the Paris 
amendment of the BC or not. 
120
 Source: http://www.kopinor.no/avtaler/statistikk/oversikt_over_statistiske_undersoekelser. This average 
covers copying pursuant to both ECLs, i.e. sections 13b and 14. 
121Source: Kopinor‟s annual report for 2007. Available at: http://www.kopinor.no/om_kopinor/aarsmelding. 
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4.2.3 A review of the ECL-model 
The ECLs can be extensive. Apart from section 50(2) DCA which undeniably is the 
broadest of them all, sections 13b, 14, 16a NCA and their equivalents in the other Nordic 
countries are probably the most extensive of the ECLs qua legal provisions. Based only on 
the above, the provisions would indeed appear problematic with respect to the first step. 
However, the ECLs possess important properties with respect to the assessment of scope. 
Firstly, the contractual basis of the ECLs seen in connection with the requirement of 
representativity entails a constriction of scope. Secondly, the contractual basis implies that 
in practice the ECL-provisions only form an outer borderline: The actual scope of the 
limitation is determined by the individual ECL-agreements, since the ECL-provision only 
extends the terms of the ECL-agreement onto the unrepresented authors. Thirdly, as 
regards section 50(2) DCA, the requirement of ministerial authorisation probably will serve 
as a limitation of scope as well, cf. below. 
 
The contractual basis and the requirement of representativity. 
The contractual basis of the ECL-model combined with the requirement that the CMO be 
representative form together an important limitation of scope: Namely that only the 
unrepresented authors are affected by a limitation of their copyrights. The represented 
authors are simply exercising their rights – not having them limited. Notwithstanding the 
scope that an ECL might have according to the abovementioned criteria, this limitation of 
scope comes in addition. In the following, the significance of this trait is to be explored in 
more detail. 
 
The requirement of representativity implies that a CMO must represent a substantial 
number of original rights holders (the actual authors) to the works of a certain category in 
order to be enabled to conclude ECL-agreements that are given extended effect for these 
types of works. The representativity requirement is limited to “works used in Norway”122, 
                                                 
122
 NCA Section 38a(1) 
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which implies that while it is insufficient to represent only national authors, it is on the 
other hand not necessary to represent a substantial number of all authors in the world. 
 
It might be argued that the requirement of substantiality only forms a very small limitation 
of scope, since its reference point is “works used in Norway”. E.g. if the world population 
of authors of a particular category of works – say translations123 – is 100 000, it could be 
sufficient for authorisation to represent 300 translators. On the other hand, although this 
obviously would be insubstantial compared to the total population of authors, it could 
nevertheless be substantial when compared to the number of authors of works used in 
Norway. Although the works of 100 000 potentially could be used pursuant to the ECL, the 
number would in practice be far less. Consequently, when a work is used pursuant to an 
ECL, the probability of it being represented by the CMO is substantial, and it is submitted 
that it is this perspective that must be used when assessing the scope of the ECL: It would 
serve few purposes to require the consideration of the most remote of probabilities when 
assessing the scope of a limitation in the sense of the first step. 
 
The ECL-provisions as an outer borderline 
When assessing the scope of a limitation, it seems natural to look at the use that is made of 
it in practice. While it might be argued that it is the potential use, and not the actual use at 
any given time that is of relevance,
124
 it is evident that one cannot operate with the most 
remote of probabilities: Stable patterns of use are a reality that the legislator must be able to 
take into consideration when formulating a provision. The fact remains that although 
containing few explicit limits, the ECL-provisions are in need of an ECL-agreement, and 
the ECL-agreement is concluded by a CMO which represents rights holders to the category 
of works that is about to be subjected to a limitation. Especially with respect to the 
                                                 
123
 Admittedly, the example of translations is a bit odd, since it can be assumed that most of the translations 
used are those into Norwegian. Thus, the risk of extensive use of foreign translations is low, which in turn 
indicates that it could be enough to represent a substantial number of national translators in order to be 
representative. 
124
 Cf. the WTO Panel‟s interpretation of the first step in the „Homestyle‟-case, WTO (2000) paragraph 6.127. 
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assessment of section 50(2) DCA this is of importance: Even if there were no requirement 
of ministerial authorisation – the requirement of representativity being the only remaining 
condition – practice from the other ECLs shows there are limits to how far the CMOs go – 
and thus to the scope of the imposed limitation. The quantification of the restrictive 
properties of the ECL-agreements, however, would necessitate empiric studies of the 
different agreements that exceed the frames of this thesis. 
 
Significance of prior authorisation 
As to the significance of prior authorisation, this is a notable limitation of the scope of 
section 50(2) DCA. While the provision is formulated in broad terms, no extended effect 
will be given to any agreement unless the contracting CMO has obtained an authorisation 
(section 50(4)). And while the primary function of this authorisation is to secure that the 
CMO is sufficiently representative,
125
 the explanatory remarks to the proposition of the 
new section 50(2) explicitly mention that the ministry should ensure that no authorisation is 
given in fields where it still is practical to clear the rights in accordance with the normal 
system of voluntary licensing.
126
 Thus, the scope of the ECL is at least functionally limited 
to situations where the normal system of copyright clearance has proven inefficient. 
Furthermore, the authorisation is to concern certain “closely defined fields” (section 50(4)). 
The meaning of this phrase is not evident, nor is there given any evident guidance as to its 
interpretation in the preparatory works. Nonetheless, it would seem consistent with the 
regulatory role of the ministry to interpret it in such a way that the ministry is enabled to 
define very narrowly the field of application in its authorisation, e.g. what forms of use, 
purposes of use etc. that may be given extended effect. Accordingly, the maximal scope of 
the extension effect pursuant to the provision in section 50(2) would be limited by the 
stipulations in the ministerial authorisation. It can consequently be argued that the 
requirement of authorisation in fact is an important limitation of scope, the significance of 
which will become clear when a practice of authorising CMOs for ECLs pursuant to 
                                                 
125
 Cf. Martin Kyst, “Aftalelicens – Quo Vadis?”, Nordiskt Immateriellt Rättsskydd, nr. 1/2009, p. 44-55 (p. 
48) 
126
 Forslag L 58 fremsatt 30.01.2008, comment to section 50(4) 
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section 50(2) has emerged. Moreover, it makes the limitation more foreseeable, since no 
authorisation means that no limitation is imposed. 
 
In conclusion it can be established that the „omnibus‟-ECL is not unlimited in scope. 
Rather, it is constricted by the requirement of authorisation in two respects: Firstly, it 
ensures a functional limitation in that the ECL may only be applied in situations of 
inefficient rights clearance, and secondly it seems probable that the ministry is empowered 
to regulate in quite some detail the scope of the ECL in its authorisation. The importance of 
the latter will nevertheless have to be ascertained by empiric studies of the emerging 
practice of authorisation. 
 
4.2.4 Conclusion 
As will have appeared from the above, all the mentioned ECLs are of a very broad nature. 
Although broad, sections 13b and 14 of the NCA are foreseeable in scope: Little is left to 
any uncertain wording or the like, although there of course are no guarantees as to the 
scope of the individual ECL-agreements that are concluded within the frames of the 
provision. The latter nonetheless seems of lesser import, as arguably, it is the maximal 
scope of any limitation that is of interest in this respect. 
 
With respect to the Danish „omnibus‟-ECL pursuant to section 50(2) of the DCA, the case 
is not so clear. While its broad scope is constricted to some degree by the requirement of 
authorisation and the constriction to situations where copyright has proven inefficient, 
these do not imply any precise definition of the scope of the ECL. Quite the contrary: The 
emerging practice is uncertain, and the notion of inefficiency is vague: Whether one 
considers the normal, voluntary exercise of copyright to be practicable or not depends on 
the perspective from which the question is answered. 
 
As demonstrated above, the scope of any ECL is substantially limited by the contractual 
basis of the ECL combined with the criterion of representativity. On the other hand, the 
initial scope of the examined ECLs is of such an extent that the remaining scope, even after 
 55 
the subtraction of the substantial number of authors has been done, can be considered quite 
large. Although the first step according to the modern interpretation does not erect any 
absolute threshold, it still has a qualificatory function in that it gives very broad limitations 
a „handicap‟ in the subsequent overall assessment. As mentioned above, the first step is not 
only a measurement of scope to be used in the subsequent steps. On the contrary, it is an 
imperative of its own implying that a limitation should be as narrow, and as precisely 
defined as possible. 
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5 Step two: Not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work 
5.1 General interpretation 
5.1.1 Introduction 
The second step forbids the limitation to “conflict with a normal exploitation of the work”. 
The word “exploitation”127 seems to imply the derivation of economic128 value – the 
“profitable management” of the work. The word “normal”129, on the other hand, is less 
clear. As pointed out by various legal scholars, the term may have both an empiric and a 
normative connotation:
130
 Firstly, it denotes a state of regularity in a strictly empiric sense. 
Secondly, it has a connotation of conformity to a normative standard or convention – that 
which should be, irrespective of any empiric data. The combination “normal exploitation” 
consequently alludes to either (or both) a usual way of deriving profit from ones work, or to 
a more normative conception of how a work should be exploited – in this sense: what 
forms of exploitation that should be reserved the author irrespective of how he and his 
fellow-authors currently and usually derive profit from their works. 
 
                                                 
127
 “The action of exploiting or turning to account; productive working or profitable management (of mines, 
cattle, etc.). Also, an instance of this.” Source: Oxford English Dictionary Online, online: 
http://www.oed.com 
128
 Taken in a broader sense: not necessarily money. 
129
 "Constituting or conforming to a type or standard; regular, usual, typical; ordinary, conventional. (The 
usual sense.)” Source: Oxford English Dictionary Online, online: http://www.oed.com 
130
 Ficsor (2002) p. 284; Lewinski (2008) p. 162; Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 768 ff; Senftleben (2004) p. 
168. 
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Lastly, the word “conflict”131 connotes the state of being contrary to something – in this 
regard, the state of being incompatible with the way in which rights holders normally 
exploit their work. 
 
5.1.2 The empirical connotation 
The empirical sense of the adjective „normal‟ causes few problems. A normal exploitation 
would be those forms of use which the authors regularly employed to derive profit from 
their works. For instance, the licensing to a publisher of the right to print and distribute 
copies would be a normal exploitation of a novel. The reproduction of a poem by 
embroidering it onto garments would, arguably, be rather abnormal in this sense. 
 
The problem of the purely empirical approach however, as pointed out by many 
commentators, is that inquiring only into the current modes of exploitation would imply 
that the very existence of a limitation affected its compatibility with the second step.
132
 It 
would only be natural that no profit was derived from uses that were exempted by virtue of 
a limitation. In case an empiric inquiry should be decisive, this would imply that the 
limitation would shelter itself from conflict with a normal exploitation of the work, since it 
precluded any normal exploitation from ever taking place within its field of operation. This 
can obviously not have been the intention of the second step. 
 
5.1.3 The normative connotation 
With regard to the normative connotation, there is less guidance in the wording itself as to 
the contents of this norm. The preparatory works of the Berne Convention may be of help. 
 
                                                 
131
 “To come into collision, to clash; to be at variance, be incompatible. (Now the chief sense.)” Source: 
Oxford English Dictionary Online, online: http://www.oed.com 
132
 Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 769 who refer to a comment made by prof. Goldstein in his book 
“International Copyright”. 
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As was contemplated by the Study Group which prepared the first draft for article 9 BC, 
the authors should be spared the situation where a limitation came into economic 
competition with the exploitation of their work.
133
 Further, all forms of use which “have, or 
are likely to acquire, considerable economic or practical importance, must be reserved to 
the authors”.134 
 
With this understanding of the concept of normality, the loophole of the purely empirical 
approach would be sealed. Instead of asking only what currently constitutes a regular way 
of deriving profit, an assessment of the likeliness of the author putting the work to 
profitable use if the limitation was thought absent would have to be conducted as well.
135
 
 
The normative content of the word „normal‟ is however not exhausted by this. As noted by 
Senftleben, there should be a lower threshold to the economic importance of the use in 
order to be characterised as „normal‟.136 The notion of regularity of use should thus not be 
entirely decisive. The rationale behind this qualification of „normality‟ is linked to the 
potential offered by the digital technology in exploiting works to a negligible transaction 
cost. As contended by Senftleben, if there were no such threshold, “nearly all ways of using 
and enjoying the works of the intellect” would end up as „normal‟ and as such beyond 
reach for any limitation.
137
 Whilst such a development would not be out of the question if 
the purpose of the three-step test were to reduce limitations to a minimum, the objective of 
ensuring a proper balance between the authors and the users would suffer. As mentioned in 
3.3.3 both WCT and TRIPS more or less explicitly state this objective. BC, on the other 
hand might at first seem to prioritise only the interests of the authors in that its preamble 
                                                 
133
 Records (1967) p. 112. 
134
 Ibid. 
135
 This appears to be a common standpoint amongst the legal scholars in the field, see e.g. Ficsor (2002) pp. 
284-285 and Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 769. 
136
 Senftleben (2004) p. 180 ff. 
137
 Senftleben (2004) p. 181. Remember, nonetheless that this only would be the case according to the 
„traditional‟ interpretation of the test. 
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reads “the countries of the Union, being equally animated by the desire to protect, in as 
effective…a manner as possible, the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works” 
(emphasis added). The reservation “as possible” might indicate that this effective 
protection is not to be pursued at any cost. As observed by the Study Group of the 
Stockholm Conference: While the uses that could amount to considerable economic or 
practical importance would need to be reserved the authors, “it should not be forgotten that 
domestic laws already contained a series of exceptions in favour of various public and 
cultural interests and that it would be in vain to suppose that countries would be ready…to 
abolish these exceptions” (emphasis added).138 Furthermore, the very existence and content 
of the specific exceptions in the Berne Convention acknowledges that public policy 
objectives are given preference over the interests of the authors.
139
 As to the lower 
threshold, guidance can again be found in the above-quoted preparatory work for the 
Stockholm Conference: That forms of use which “have, or are likely to acquire 
considerable economic…importance”140 (emphasis added) should be reserved the author. 
Incidentally, the inclusion of the qualifier „considerable‟ is shared by many authors, many 
not as explicit as Senftleben.
141
 
 
Finally, the normative connotation of the adjective „normal‟ could imply that non-
economic normative considerations are to be included as well. Whilst this to a certain 
degree has been done in the above establishment of a lower threshold for the economic 
importance of a use, the word still leaves room for more overall considerations of what 
markets the author should be able to control.
142
 Especially under the traditional view of the 
interplay between the three steps, such an interpretation would be important, as it would 
serve as a safety-valve where the economy-centred perspective of the second step proved 
detrimental to key objectives of public interest. According to the modern interpretation of 
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 Records (1967) p. 111-112. 
139
 Cf. Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) pp. 771-772. 
140
 Records (1967) p. 112. 
141
 Ficsor (2002) p. 285; Lewinski (2008) p. 162; Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) pp. 769-770. 
142
 Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) pp. 771-773. 
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the three-step test, this part of the normative consideration can however safely be deferred 
to the third step, which already embodies such considerations of colliding interests. 
 
In sum, the notion of a “normal exploitation” implies regular derivation of „considerable‟ 
profit. A conflict with the threshold of the second step would provide the limitation with a 
severe handicap in the consequent balancing of interests to be done in the third step. 
Although the three-step test calls for a comprehensive, overall assessment, the prioritisation 
of economic interests which obviously is inherent in the imperative of the second step may 
not be ignored.  
 
5.1.4 The dynamics of the third step: When does a limitation amount to a 
„conflict‟? 
Having established that a certain use constitutes a normal exploitation, e.g. the licensing of 
letterpress reproductions of novels for subsequent distribution, clearly the exemption of 
such a use altogether would conflict with this normal exploitation: The author would be 
divested of this normal source of income. Limitations of a smaller scope could nonetheless 
be admissible. 
 
Arguably, the linguistic structure of the second step implies that when a use demonstrably 
is normal, no exemption or limitation on this use may be introduced at all, since a 
limitation is, arguably, incompatible with exclusivity. This interpretation must nevertheless 
fail. The second step does not imply that when a certain use has been shown to generate 
considerable profit it may not be touched at all. If it were so it would suffice to proclaim 
that no limitation on (e.g.) the reproduction right was permissible, since clearly, the use of a 
work by means of reproduction is a considerable source of revenue for the author.
143
 The 
relevant question is whether the exempted use – the scope of the limitation – has or 
potentially could acquire a considerable economic importance if otherwise in the hands of 
the author. Likewise, if the exempted use entered into „considerable‟ economic competition 
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 Inspired by Senftleben (2004) p. 181, although he uses the train of thought in a slightly different context. 
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with ways in which the author normally exploited his work, this would amount to a conflict 
irrespective of whether the author himself could have derived profit from it.
144
 The author 
should be safeguarded from such economic competition which is only rendered possible by 
a limitation of his initial sphere of exclusivity. An exemplification to this effect can be 
found in the comments of the Main Committee I of the Stockholm Conference: 
 
“A practical example might be photocopying for various purposes. If it consists of producing a very 
large number of copies, it may not be permitted, as it conflicts with a normal exploitation of the work. 
If it implies a rather large number of copies for use in industrial undertaking, it may not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author, provided that, according to national legislation, an 
equitable remuneration is paid.”145 
 
It seems odd to interpret the example as claiming that the reproduction of a very large 
number of copies on a photocopier in itself was a way in which authors normally derived 
considerable profit from their works. While it may be so, the example would be just as 
meaningful if it were taken to imply that the copying of a very large number of copies (in 
many cases) would unduly compete with the way in which authors derive profit from their 
works, e.g. partly the possibility of establishing licensing schemes for such photocopying, 
partly the sale of their works by other means. The reproduction of fewer copies would not 
rise to a „considerable‟ level of conflict even though one single copy could prevent a 
regular sale: The total effect of the limitation would not amount to depriving the author of a 
source of considerable economic importance. 
 
5.2 The system of ECL 
5.2.1 Introduction 
As with the first step, only the exemplification and review of a few ECL-provisions, with 
the subsequent review of certain common properties of the ECLs (the ECL-model), will be 
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 In this direction, WTO (2000) paragraph 6.183 and implicitly Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 770. 
145
 Records (1967) pp. 1145-1146. 
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provided. Although such an examination is not exhaustive, it is sufficient to give an 
impression of the compliance of the ECL-model with the second step. 
 
5.2.2 A review of certain provisions 
An important regard when reviewing the ECL-model is, as shown in the test of the first 
step, that the ECL-provisions create an extensive framework within which it is up to the 
CMOs through the ECL-agreements to decide the final scope of the limitation: The 
limitations on the non-represented authors‟ rights will never exceed the boundaries of the 
ECL-agreement. This interdependence is important as it implies, as will be shown, that a 
conflict with the second step cannot be assessed only on the basis of the scope of the ECL-
provision, but must take account of the special qualities of the contractual basis of the 
ECL-model as crystallised in the need for an ECL-agreement. 
 
The two ECLs chosen for exemplification are sections 13b and 16a since they illustrate the 
different aspects of the market failure rationale inherent to the ECL-model which, as will 
be seen, is relevant to the test of the second step. 
 
Section 13b NCA 
Section 13b permits the reproduction of any work, and the subsequent use of the copy, as 
long as it is confined to purposes of education within the user-institution, and as long as it 
does not involve copying on a scale similar to that normally undertaken by a publisher. 
This framework nevertheless leaves room for quite intense use.  
 
Based only on the scope of the provision, it is easy to envision uses that would both 
conflict and not conflict with a normal exploitation of many classes of works. 
 
The copying of newspaper articles, for instance, is a case where the required purpose of use 
(educational use) probably would keep the ECL clear of conflict with normal exploitation. 
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Their primary market – subscriptions and sale to non-subscribers146 – would probably not 
suffer any considerable loss from such copying. Neither does there seem to be any regular 
market for licensing such photocopying directly. 
 
The opposite is easily imaginable with respect to extensive copying of learning-materials in 
schools. It is evident that widespread photocopying of even a few pages often could reduce 
the need to acquire a copy from the publisher, and thus compete with the market for the 
latter. With respect to the sales-market for booklets intended for one-time use by pupils, 
allowing even a very limited number of copies could severely impair the respective market. 
 
Section 16a NCA 
Apart from the personal limitation to the ALM-sector and the requirements that the work 
be published and contained in the collections of the institution, there are only other minor 
limitations, and the uses allowed are extensive: reproduction and communication to the 
public
147
. 
 
Based solely on the scope of the ECL-provision, section 16a also has the potential of 
coming into conflict with normal use of many categories of works. For instance, in the case 
of new novels, the primary market is often regular sale of books. If the libraries, pursuant to 
section 16a, were enabled to scan and subsequently e-mail books to their clients, this could 
obviously unduly compete with the sales-market. While the current library lending-practice 
has limited impact on the sales market as it is restricted to physical copies, the potential of 
digital distribution clearly alters this. 
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 Cf. Paul Torremans, Archiving exceptions – where are we and where do we need to go?, p. 11. Online: 
www.nottingham.ac.uk/law2/news-and-events/Archiving_exceptions-final.doc (last accessed: May 2009) 
147
 Cf. 2.3.1.4. 
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5.2.3 A review of the ECL-model – the „defences‟ of the ECL 
The above findings may seem grave, but they are only part of a greater picture: As 
mentioned, the ECL-provisions only create the outer frames, whilst it is the ECL-
agreements that in each case decide the extent of the limitation within these frames. This is 
central to the assessment of the second step, and will be examined below. Furthermore: 
While at first blush the scope of the provisions might appear broad enough to cover a 
potential conflict with a normal exploitation of the works covered, the very market failure 
rationale inherent to the ECL might lead to another result as will be explained below. 
 
5.2.3.1 The market-failure rationale 
As acknowledged by the Holmøy Committee when assessing the compatibility of [the 
current] sections 13b and 14 with the Paris Act of the Berne Convention, much of the use 
pursuant to the ECL would encroach upon the normal exploitation of the works covered.
148
 
Nonetheless the committee contended that such conflict was the result of a market failure – 
already existing illegal use due to unenforceability of copyright – and that the ECL itself 
did not rise to such conflict.
149
 This is the one half of the market failure rationale. 
 
The other half concentrates on the situation where inefficiency in clearing rights causes 
prohibitively high transaction costs. Instead of leading to illegal use, the situation leads to a 
lack of use – a situation of „untapped potential‟: The users want to use the work, the author 
wants to licence the use, but the costs connected with clearing the rights (not the price of 
the work) are too high. It is obvious that in these circumstances, a limitation releasing this 
untapped potential would at least not directly encroach upon a regular way of exploiting a 
work.  
 
The latter half of the market failure-rationale can for instance be found in the ECL pursuant 
to section 16a. It is not explicitly stated, but it can be inferred from the preparatory works 
                                                 
148
 NOU 1988: 22 p. 24. 
149
 Ibid. 
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that a motivation for its imposition is the release of untapped potential.
150
 The same applies 
to the Danish „omnibus‟-ECL of section 50(2) DCA. The preparatory works explicitly state 
that authorisation pursuant to section 50(4) should not be given where normal rights 
clearance is practical.
151
 
 
Significance of the market failure argument 
In the illegal use-situations, the Holmøy Committee was – in my opinion – correct in 
asserting that no conflict would arise as far as the limitation covered use which would have 
been made illegally anyway. In this situation it is not the limitation, but rather the failure of 
making the users comply with the outset of prohibition that causes the conflict with the 
normal exploitation of the work.  
 
The outset of prohibition could of course be reinforced by increasing the criminal liability, 
or by similar measures which would reduce the scope of the illegal activity. This is 
however not an obligation under the present conventions, and it could thus not be used to 
create a frame of reference when assessing the conflict with a normal exploitation of such 
limitations.  
 
Another objection is that the limitation encroaches upon the right to sue for damages. 
While this might prove prejudicial to the legitimate interests of the rights holders in the 
sense of the third step, it is relatively clear that the practice of suing for damages is not a 
normal way of exploiting works in Norway: Norwegian law does not recognise punitive 
damages, and the economic prejudice caused by single instances of use is often 
prohibitively small in this relation. Whatever prejudice caused to this right by the system of 
ECL would thus not rise to a conflict with a normal exploitation of the work. 
 
Finally, although legalising the illegal use by virtue of ECLs might not directly encroach 
upon normal exploitation of the work, a question arises as to indirect conflict, which as 
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 Cf. Ot.prp. nr. 46 (2004-2005) chapter 3.4.7. 
151
 Forslag L 58 fremsatt 30.01.2008, comment to section 50(4) 
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seen above also is contrary to the second step. If the use according to the ECL were to 
assume considerable market shares from a use that is normal, this could rise to a conflict. In 
the case of illegal use, what was earlier done for free is to be encompassed by a licensing 
scheme with the ECL. Provided that the ECL-agreement imposes a duty to remunerate the 
use, the user institution would now need to pay where before it did not pay. In turn, this 
could lead to the reduced purchasing of e.g. new books to the library due to a lack of 
funding. It would seem odd to deem such circumstances to be in conflict with a normal 
exploitation of works: The link between such reduced purchasing power and the effect on 
the normal exploitation of works would be both weak and difficult to establish to any 
appreciable degree. The argument must thus fail. 
 
Successfully arguing that the untapped potential brings conformity with the second step 
hinges upon the logic that when the work is not used, no profit is derived (currently or 
potentially). A limitation releasing this potential would accordingly have no normal 
exploitation to conflict with. 
 
Although it may be presumed that much of the use pursuant to sections 13b and 14 would 
have been done illegally in their absence, and although section 16a is directed at releasing 
untapped potential, the ECL-provisions do not limit the ECL-agreements to the cases of 
market failure. For instance, if the „untapped‟ need for a digital library service152 were 
solved by implementing a broad right for libraries to lend digital copies (e.g. by e-mailing, 
on-line downloading or otherwise) this could come to conflict with the normal sales-
market, and especially with the emerging digital one. Concerning section 13b, it would for 
instance be conceivable that the authors of booklets for one-time use in schools had 
agreements with the schools which both earned them considerable revenues and averted 
illegal use. In that case, a limitation allowing copying would conflict with a normal 
exploitation. 
                                                 
152
 A potential testified to by the recently concluded ECL-agreement for the making available on-line of read-
only copies of Norwegian books from the 1790-ies, 1890-ies and 1990-ies on the website of the national 
library, see http://www.kopinor.no/avtaler/avtaleomraader/nasjonalbiblioteket (Norwegian only). 
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In sum, as far as the ECLs only allow use that otherwise would have been subject to market 
failure, they will avoid conflict with a normal exploitation of the works thus used. As seen, 
the ECL-provisions fail to ensure that only use subject to market failure is covered: Even 
though the fields in which they are imposed are marked by such, their scope is very 
extensive. This calls for the announced examination of the significance of the contractual 
basis of the ECL. 
 
5.2.3.2 The contractual basis and the requirement of representativity 
The scope of the ECL-provisions is intentionally broad, in order to give the CMOs the 
necessary flexibility to conclude ECL-agreements that best fit the needs of the parties. 
While it would be possible to narrow the scope by annexing a list of specifications to the 
provisions, the ECL-model relies on the assumption that the authors know best how their 
works are exploited, and that this flexibility will not be used to maximise the limitations in 
all directions, but to tailor them. 
 
The ECLs‟ combination of the contract-mechanism with the requirement of representativity 
ensures that any limitation imposed on third-party rights holders has been approved on a 
voluntary basis by a “substantial”153 number of authors of works of the same category. In 
other words, the limitation imposed on the unrepresented authors by virtue of extending the 
ECL-agreement is in fact only a compulsion for the author to exploit his work in a manner 
that this substantial number of authors have found to be a „normal exploitation‟ of their 
own works. The authors are, arguably, best positioned to know how to exploit their works; 
accordingly, one can ask if the contractual basis of the ECL in fact averts conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the works on this basis alone. 
 
An obvious problem is the significance of the singular form of “the work” in the second 
step. If this implies that a separate assessment of normality must be conducted with respect 
                                                 
153
 Section 38a NCA. 
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to each and every work, an assertion of representativity would be meaningless in this 
regard, since representativity is only relevant if one can operate with categories of works. 
There are, however, significant objections to this interpretation of the second step: Firstly, 
requiring that the limitations be relative to the individual work in question would imply an 
unfounded preference of „fair use‟-type limitations:154 The preparatory works give no 
indication of such a preference, and when the three-step (BC) was introduced, there already 
existed limitations that did not necessitate a per-work evaluation,
155
 which is relevant since 
the test was conceived as capable of „grandfathering‟ existing limitations.156 Secondly, the 
concept of regularity which is inherent to the concept of “normal exploitation” points at 
assessing a category of works – not every work separately: It is difficult to see how the 
exploitation of a work could be „regular‟ if it has no frame of reference (e.g. a category). 
 
A question nonetheless arises as to the delineation of appropriate categories under the 
second step. With respect to the system of ECLs, the question is whether the requirement of 
representativity conforms to this way of categorising works. For instance: If the NFF 
(Norwegian Non-Fiction Writers and Translators‟ Association), an authorised ECL-
institution, engages in an ECL-agreement concerning all non-fiction works – would this be 
an appropriate category of works? 
 
There does not seem to be any obvious way of drawing these lines. This needs not be of 
any great concern: According to the „modern‟ interpretation of the relation between the 
three steps, the outcome of the second step is not cardinal to the status of the limitation. In 
fact, it is the third step that ultimately will decide its fate. Thus, for the purposes of the 
following, it is deemed serviceable to postulate that representativity in the sense of the 
ECL-model conforms to the categorisation of works allowed by the second step. This 
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 US Copyright Act (UCA) Section 107 according to which fair use must be assessed for every instance of 
use. 
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 E.g. the private use-exemption which was obviously taken into consideration at the time, cf. Records 
(1967) p. 111 ff. 
156
 Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 776 
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means that when a CMO is authorised to conclude ECL-agreements with respect to a 
certain category of works, this very category is a relevant unit with respect to the 
assessment of conflict with a normal exploitation. 
 
By all standards, use according to an ECL-agreement would have to be regarded as „normal 
exploitation‟ of the works covered. The ECL-agreement is concluded by a substantial 
number of authors of the category of works concerned, which ensures that the necessary 
regularity required in order to be deemed „normal‟ is attained. Additionally, it can be 
affirmed that the ECLs generate considerable revenues. When extending the ECL-
agreement onto third party authors, the user-parties to the agreement are consequently 
enabled to make a „normal‟ use of the unrepresented works. But, is the author thereby 
deprived of a regular, considerable source of revenue? Rather the contrary: That which is 
normal, is the ECL-agreement as it stands at any given time. When this subsequently is 
extended, the author is not deprived of this normal exploitation of his work – he is forced to 
exploit it this way. 
 
Hence, the requirement of representativity ensures that the ECL-agreement at least is a 
normal exploitation of the type of work covered. On the other hand, as the requirement of 
representativity only entails the need for “substantial” representation, it is theoretically 
possible that the category of works covered by the ECL is subject to other, parallel, normal 
exploitations that either directly or indirectly are adversely affected by the ECL. However, 
as will be discussed in more detail in the examination of the third step below, while the 
substantiality-requirement might fail to ensure that the CMO is truly representative for the 
interests of the group, it entails a strong presumption. Concerning the second step it may 
thus be presumed that the normal use pursuant to the ECL does not unduly displace another 
normal exploitation. 
 
5.2.4 Conclusion 
The above investigation shows that while the ECL-provisions are broad enough to possibly 
come into conflict with a normal exploitation of the works thus limited, the provisions 
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cannot be assessed in isolation: The dependence upon ECL-agreements to be concluded by 
representative CMOs entails a constriction of scope which, in practice, will make the ECL 
conformant with the second step.  
 
Where in practice it can be demonstrated that the permitted use pursuant to the ECL 
competes with [other] normal forms of exploitation, the market failure rationale entails that 
if the use in the absence of the ECL would have been done illegally, it is not the ECL as 
such that conflicts with the normal exploitation; it would certainly be in the interest of the 
CMO to permit such use, in order to at least obtain profit from it, and presumably stand a 
better chance of regulating it. Since the ECL brings legality so close to hand, the user might 
feel incited to operate legally. 
 
The ECL nonetheless fails to establish certainty in that the CMO will not conclude ECL-
agreements that exceed the limits of the second step. It only establishes a strong 
presumption. In case a conflict should be demonstrated, at least it is that of one normal use 
displacing another. In the end, the non-represented authors are ensured a normal 
exploitation of their works, which might add to the ECL being „reasonable‟ in terms of the 
third step. 
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6 Step three: Not unreasonably prejudice the interests of the rights holder 
6.1 General interpretation 
6.1.1 Introduction 
As distinct from the two preceding steps, the wording of the third step appears relatively 
clear: “prejudice”157 connotes harm, the “legitimate”158 “interests”159 connotes interests of a 
certain, qualified kind, whilst the word “unreasonably”160 indicates something that exceeds 
the bounds of reason; something which is unjustified. 
 
In sum, based on a reading of the terms according to their ordinary meaning, the third step 
calls for a comprehensive evaluation of the prejudice caused the authors by the limitation: 
A balancing of interests must be done, where, depending on the interests at stake on both 
sides, the harm caused the rights holder might rise to an unreasonable level. In such a case, 
the limitation would be inadmissible. 
 
                                                 
157
 “To affect adversely or unfavourably as a consequence of some action.” Source: Oxford English 
Dictionary Online, online: http://www.oed.com 
158
 “Conformable to law or rule; sanctioned or authorized by law or right; lawful; proper.” Source: Oxford 
English Dictionary Online, online: http://www.oed.com 
159
 “The relation of being objectively concerned in something, by having a right or title to, a claim upon, or a 
share in.” “The fact or relation of being legally concerned; legal concern in a thing; esp. right or title to 
property, or to some of the uses or benefits pertaining to property.” Source: Oxford English Dictionary 
Online, online: http://www.oed.com 
160
 “1. In a manner at variance with reason; without due observance of reason or good judgement. 2. To an 
unreasonable extent; excessively, immoderately.” Source: Oxford English Dictionary Online, online: 
http://www.oed.com 
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Although the above, superficial, reading of the wording gives a rather clear impression of 
the purpose and function of the third step, a closer look at its different components is 
necessary in order to determine its application more precisely. 
 
6.1.2 “legitimate interests” 
The term „interests‟ (of the author) leaves little doubt that the measurement of prejudice is 
in relation to the authors‟ interests in upholding the exclusive rights as they are. The 
addition of the word „legitimate‟ has caused some debate; „legitimate‟ may connote both 
something that is sanctioned by law and something which is qualified by some other 
normative standard. In other words, the interests of the author can be understood in a 
positivistic sense, i.e. the interests protected by law, or as a more general sensation of 
concern for something which in turn must be of a certain quality in order to be reckoned 
with.
161
 
 
The difference in interpretation materialises in the question of whether the concept of 
legitimate interests directs a further qualification of the authors‟ interests beyond 
ascertaining that they are „lawful‟ in a positivistic sense: Although the interest which is 
harmed by the limitation could be said to be „lawful‟, no “prejudice” would arise if it were 
not qualified in some other sense as well (e.g. promoting certain public policy objectives). 
This interpretation would have appeared correct if the test of the third step had only 
included an assessment conflict with the interests of the author. Ficsor persuasively argues 
that the addition of the adverb “unreasonably” makes such an additional normative 
consideration both superfluous and wrong.
162
 In the initial formulation of the third step, the 
qualification of unreasonableness was not included. It would hence appear evident that the 
notion of legitimacy included an additional normative test, otherwise no limitation would 
pass the third step -evidently, some moral or pecuniary harm will be caused the author 
when imposing a limitation. However, as contended by Ficsor, when the adverb was added 
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 Cf. Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 774 
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 Ficsor (2002) pp. 286-288. 
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without the concept of legitimacy being removed, the sense of the latter shifted from 
directing a normative assessment to only requiring that the interests be sanctioned by 
law.
163
 In turn, this means that the „legitimate interests‟ of the author in the case of the BC 
and the WCT include both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary (moral) interests, whilst the 
sphere of interests in the TRIPS agreement must be narrowed to only cover the pecuniary 
interests, as article 9(1) explicitly exempts article 6bis BC (moral rights) from its scope of 
protection. 
  
Conclusively, it can thus be ascertained that the concept of „legitimate interests‟ does not 
require any further, normative qualification of the interests in question. This naturally 
leaves the sphere of interests quite open. This does however not pose a problem, as a 
limitation is more likely to be unreasonable if the interest is strongly justified in the 
normative perspective. 
 
6.1.3 “unreasonably prejudice” 
Having determined the proper sphere of interests to be evaluated, the next question is 
whether these interests are being prejudiced, and secondly whether this prejudice is 
unreasonable. 
 
Arguably, any limitation of the exclusive rights does to a certain extent prejudice the 
interests of authors. If not of the authors in general, e.g. if a limitation permits uses which 
they would not be able to control anyway, then at least to some particular authors who do 
in fact manage to exploit or otherwise control their works. This cannot be decisive, and the 
adverb “unreasonably” has been introduced to ensure that such prejudice will not topple the 
limitation: Only that which reaches an unreasonable level.
164
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 Ibid. p. 287. 
164
 Cf. the comments of the chairman in Records (1967) p. 883. (Source found in Ficsor (2002) p. 288) 
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Consequently, the third step consists of first determining the degree of prejudice caused the 
interests of the author, and secondly determining whether this level of prejudice is 
unreasonable. In the preparatory works to the BC, the Main Committee I gave the 
following example: 
 
“A practical example might be photocopying for various purposes…If it implies a rather large number 
of copies for use in industrial undertakings, it may not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the author, provided that, according to national legislation, an equitable remuneration is paid. If a 
small number of copies is made, photocopying may be permitted without payment, particularly for 
individual or scientific use.”165 
 
The example is instructive in two ways: Firstly, it indicates that the degree of prejudice to 
the interests of the author depends upon the configuration of the limitation in question. For 
instance an obligation to pay for the use could bring a limitation within the boundaries of 
reason, where a free use provision otherwise would be unreasonable. Secondly, it 
demonstrates that the outcome of the test of unreasonableness depends on the user-specific 
interests at stake. This implies that the test of unreasonableness requires a balancing of 
interests, where the user-specific interests (public policy objectives etc.) must justify the 
prejudice caused the interests of the author. Although some caution should be exercised 
when extracting arguments from the example, due to its character of supplementary means 
of interpretation, this seems to lie well within an ordinary construction of the third step. 
There has been some opposition to the understanding that the third step allows for 
compulsory licences. According to Desbois et al. the choice of the third step is either that 
of free use exception or no exception, in the sense that the obligation to pay remuneration 
does not affect the outcome of the test.
166
 This view is shared by few, and there seems to be 
something close to unanimity between the leading legal scholars in the field.
167
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 Records (1967) pp. 1145-1146 
166
 Henri Desbois, André Françon, André Kéréver, Les Conventions internationales du droit d’auteur et des 
droits voisins, Paris 1976, p. 207. Source found in Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) pp. 775 and 777. 
167
 See e.g. Ficsor (2002) p. 188; Lewinski (2008) pp. 163-164; Senftleben (2004) p. 237; Ricketson/Ginsburg 
(2006) pp. 775-777. 
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As to the closer determination of the norm guiding said balancing of interest, the wording 
of the third step is of little guidance. It would appear logical that the more the limitation 
prejudices the interests of the author, the more cogent or „worthy‟ must the public policy 
objectives underlying the limitation be for the prejudice to appear „reasonable‟. This does 
however not determine where the threshold of unreasonableness lies. An indication, which 
incidentally only is relevant to the modern approach to the system of three steps, is that 
limitations which are difficult to reconcile with the first two steps are „unreasonably 
prejudicial‟, and that somehow the limitation would need to reduce the prejudice on the 
author or otherwise be underpinned by very cogent public interests if to pass the third step. 
However, the question of which interests that are „very cogent‟ and which that are not is 
not thereby solved, and it must be admitted that the threshold of the third step is still vague, 
apart from the circumstance that the prejudice must be of a qualified graveness before it 
reaches the level of unreasonableness. However, considering the nature of the subsequent 
inquiry into the compliance of the ECL-model with the three-step test, it is contended that a 
more precise determination of this threshold is not strictly necessary. 
 
6.1.4 Conclusion 
The third step calls for a comprehensive evaluation, where the interests of the users must be 
balanced against the frustrated interests of the authors. In this sense, the compilation of the 
limitation is of central interest. The broader the scope, the more probable the limitation is to 
prejudice the interests of the authors. Thus, measures such as the obligation to pay for use 
must be assessed as well, since the economic interests of the author are prejudiced less if he 
is being remunerated. Likewise, it can be assumed that the authors are interested in having 
a say in how the limitation is crafted. Limitations including the opportunity for the authors 
of influencing its scope or functioning thus must be presumed to be less prejudicial. Hence, 
it can be assumed that compulsory licences are less prejudicial to the interests of the author 
than statutory licences, which in turn are less prejudicial than free use provisions. 
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6.2 The system of ECL 
6.2.1 Introduction 
As with all limitations, the ECLs prejudice the interests of some authors. Correspondingly, 
the ECLs are imposed in order to attain certain policy objectives. The ECL is first and 
foremost imposed as a means of providing a practical and efficient method of clearing 
rights, where individual conclusion of licence agreements is deemed too great a hindrance. 
The interests which in turn may benefit from such facilitated rights clearance are many, and 
vary with the individual ECL. This thesis is not an analysis of how the individual ECLs and 
the particular policy objectives they promote relate to the third step, but an examination and 
discussion of how the model of ECL satisfies the requirements of the third step. Such an 
examination cannot be performed in a vacuum – a frame of reference is needed. In this 
respect both a comparison to other forms of limitation and to internal variations of 
configuration between ECLs may serve as a reference point. In short, the objective is to 
examine whether the ECL-model, as crafted to forge compromises between the need for 
easy rights clearance and the authorial interest in retaining individual control over works, is 
more likely to be „reasonable‟ in the terminology of the third step. 
 
6.2.2 Presentation of the different traits to be discussed 
All limitations or restrictions on copyright seek to achieve some objective by somehow 
modifying the outset of protection and exclusive rights conferred on the rights holders. 
Different methods are used, and can be categorised (inter alia) according to the way they 
limit copyright. The ECL, as a category of limitations, has especially one key trait that is 
different from other types of limitations, namely its contractual, collective basis. As will be 
shown below, three circumstances of interest to the test in the third step are occasioned by 
this contractual basis. 
 
While the contractual, collective basis entails certain advantages with respect to satisfying 
the third step, the collective foundation also raises some questions pertaining to the system 
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of remuneration pursuant to the ECL: The current ECLs leave it to the CMO to determine 
the distribution of collected funds. The significance hereof will be discussed in 6.2.7. 
 
Moreover, although not a necessary trait of ECLs, many ECLs nonetheless provide an opt-
out right for authors. Such a right is of central relevance to the third step, and in light of the 
present trend to increase both the number and extent of ECLs while in return providing an 
opt-out right, this point will be elaborated in 6.2.8. 
 
Finally, all ECLs have been imposed in situations marked by market failure, where 
individual contracting is the exception rather than the rule. This is of relevance to the test of 
the third step, as will be seen below. In this regard, the digital „revolution‟ is by many 
thought to reduce the need for limitations on copyright due to the opportunities entailed for 
the author to regain control over works through DRM-systems. The significance of the 
modern, digital situation for the ECLs will be given consideration in 6.2.9. 
 
6.2.3 The contractual basis: An introduction 
The ECL extends the terms of a contract onto unrepresented authors in substitute for 
explicit stipulation directly in the law; three interesting effects arise from this: Firstly, the 
fact that the author-parties to the ECL-agreement are not affected by the limitation. 
Secondly, the collective, contractual basis combined with the extension effect implies that 
the CMO achieves a de facto monopoly vis-à-vis the users, thus substantially increasing its 
bargaining power. Lastly, and as touched upon in connection with the second step, the 
collective, contractual basis ensures that the limitation which eventually is imposed on the 
non-member authors has been subjected to delineation and approval by a substantial 
number of authors of works of the same category as the affected author. 
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6.2.4 Fewer authors affected 
In terms of prejudicing authors‟ interests, it is clear that a reduction in the number of 
authors affected by a limitation must necessarily reduce the overall prejudicial effect of the 
limitation: The unaffected authors do not experience any prejudice. 
 
It follows that the larger the CMO, the less global prejudice is inflicted by the ECL, since 
the member authors are exercising their copyright, not having it limited. Nonetheless, the 
formal requirement is only that a “substantial” number be represented. As seen in the 
discussion of the first step, the requirement might be satisfied with relatively low 
proportional representation.
168
 This is not problematic, as the aim of section 38a is to 
ensure representativity of the CMO for the category of affected authors.
169
 A high 
proportion is not required as long as the number is sufficient to ensure that individual 
members‟ interests are not favoured at the expense of common interests in the group. It 
does however imply that the significance of the substantiality-criterion pursuant to section 
38a NCA in lowering the prejudice on the rights holders is reduced – at least theoretically. 
 
In practice, the number of authors needed to be considered representative will depend on 
how well-organised the market is. If, in a certain market, the authors are highly organised, 
it would be natural to require that the CMO represent a quite large portion of these to be 
considered representative. In case the authors are organised in smaller collectives, section 
38a (1) provides the ministry with the power to require that the authorised organisation be 
an umbrella organisation for these smaller collectives.
170
 In such a situation, the reduction 
of authors affected could become quite significant. Considering also the reciprocity-
agreements usually concluded between the larger CMOs worldwide, the overall number of 
rights holders left unaffected by the limitative function of the ECL could indeed become 
significant. 
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 Although it must be kept in mind that operating with percentages in any case is problematic, see 2.3.1.9. 
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 Cf. Ot.prp. nr. 15 (1994-1995) p. 27. 
170
 Cf. Ot.prp. nr. 54 (1978-1979) p. 10, where such a solution is indicated.  
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In less organised markets, the situation is different. The number of represented authors is 
lower, and the number of authors affected by the limitation higher. Although there might be 
a sufficient number of organised authors to ensure representativity, this would certainly 
reduce the potency of this particular argument towards seeing the ECL as a better 
alternative than the outright compulsory licences. 
 
6.2.5 Increased bargaining power 
By concluding the ECL-agreement, the CMO does not only manage the rights of its 
members, but also those of all authors within the same field as the ECL-agreement. A grant 
of licence allows the user to use all works within the category as long as- and to the extent 
that it is allowed in the terms of use in the ECL-agreement. On the other hand, a denial of 
concluding an ECL-agreement means that the user is unable to use legally any work within 
the category, unless by individual agreement with the authors or if the use is covered by 
another limitation, e.g. the private use exemption. 
 
Considering that for most users of ECLs it is imperative that they are allowed to use 
copyrighted material, and considering furthermore that the situations in which ECLs are 
imposed are characterised by the impossibility of concluding individual agreements, the 
situation may amount to a de facto monopoly for the CMO. 
 
As compared to ordinary compulsory licences, where the author negotiates only on behalf 
of himself, and where his contractual foothold is further weakened since the power to deny 
the use of the work is bereft him, replaced instead by statutory conditions of use, the unique 
position of the CMO substantially increases the bargaining power of the authors.
171
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 Although it cannot be ruled out that certain few authors would have been able to negotiate a higher price 
pursuant to a compulsory licence than the uniform fee pursuant to the ECL-agreement. 
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To exemplify, both in 1984 and in 2006 Kopinor
172
 and its contracting party (the Ministry of Culture 
and The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS) respectively) failed to agree 
on the licensing terms and fees for copying in schools. In 2006, the collapse led to a 96-day 
prohibition of copying copyright material in schools. According to the initial surveys conducted, the 
ban was only poorly respected (as opposed to 1984). When Kopinor consequently inserted 
advertisements in the newspapers, visited schools and alerted the pupils of the illegality of the 
copying, later surveys indicated that the prohibition eventually was respected. In turn, this caused 
severe problems in education,
173
 the preparations for the end-of-term exams and purportedly also for 
the grading of pupils. Eventually, KS and Kopinor agreed to solve the dispute by arbitration.
174
 
 
Evidently, the described case is special since in the educational sector, a common agreement for all 
public learning institutions (except higher education) is negotiated between Kopinor and KS. The 
collapse of negotiations thus affected the whole educational sector. In the cases where Kopinor 
concludes individual agreements, e.g. with businesses pursuant to section 14b NCA, there is less 
reason to believe that a ban will be as effective. Nonetheless, compared to the situation pursuant to an 
ordinary compulsory licence, there still is reason to believe that the ECL-institution has a better 
foothold in the contractual negotiations. 
 
While this situation of de facto monopoly might render the ECL less usable as a tool in 
cases where the policy objectives require a more secure – or even cheaper – access to 
works, this does not alter the fact that the ECL in the hands of the authors is a powerful tool 
vis-à-vis the users.
175
 
 
Although the increased bargaining power may benefit the average authorial interest by 
increasing the average collected remuneration, the prejudice-reducing effect depends on the 
                                                 
172
 The Norwegian „umbrella‟- CMO in the field of reproduction. 
173
 Which was bound to depend on photocopying through the curriculum fixed by the ministry. 
174
 Source: Kopinornytt nr. 1/2006, available at: http://www.kopinor.no/om_kopinor/kopinornytt. (Norwegian 
only) 
175
 See Rognstad (2004) pp. 157-158 for a discussion of whether the ECL-model is useful as a limitation in all 
relations. 
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subsequent distribution scheme.
176
 Bargaining power vis-à-vis the users is only half the 
equation. As will be shown in 6.2.7, in the relation between the CMO and the affected third 
party authors, it is not immediately clear that the ECL is less prejudicial to the interests of 
the authors than is e.g. an ordinary compulsory licence. 
 
6.2.6 Delineation and approval of limitation by substantial number of authors of 
works of the same category as the affected author. 
Pursuant to the contractual foundation of the ECL, no limitation is in fact imposed until an 
ECL-agreement is concluded. The moment this contract is concluded, the ECL springs to 
life by extending the terms of the ECL-agreement onto the non-member rights holders as 
well. In turn, this implies that within the freedom given the CMO by the [quite sizeable] 
ECL-provisions, it is up to the collective to delineate and concretise the further terms of use 
which to the non-members will materialise as a limitation on their exclusive right once the 
extension effect is applied.  
 
A key to understanding the rationale of the ECL is that the delineation is done by a 
collective which represents a “substantial” number of authors of works of the same 
category as the non-member authors who are affected by the resulting limitation.
177
 The 
perspective is that this approach contributes to lessen the prejudice inflicted on the interests 
of the authors by the limitation, since the limitation‟s terms of use are delineated and 
approved by authors of similar works. As opposed to compulsory licences where the terms 
of use are stipulated by rigid legislation, the ECL provides a more flexible solution in 
which the authors may tailor the solution which best fits them. 
 
                                                 
176
 And of course also on the costs incurred by administering the ECL-scheme. Nonetheless, it is assumed that 
in general, the transaction costs of the ECL scheme is lower than the average cost would be pursuant to 
individual licensing. 
177
 See 2.3.1.9.  
 82 
The conception is founded upon the assumption that authors of works of the same category 
share common interests with respect to the use of their works. Copyright is individual for a 
reason: The authors know best how to put their works to use in order to create maximum 
utility and incentive for themselves.
178
 This notwithstanding, it seems safe to assert that 
most authors [of similar works] share at least a minimum of interests in common – an 
assumption the correctness of which is testified to by the very existence of CMOs and other 
rights representation organisations. Naturally, on a strictly individual plane, the authors 
probably would have too high a degree of varying personal interest for any one author to be 
representative for the group. By requiring „substantial‟ representation, however, it is 
believed that overall representativity for the group of authors is achieved.
179
 Subsequently, 
because the ECL-agreement reflects the condensed interests of this [presumably] 
representative group, it can be assumed that the ECL in fact is „reasonable‟ within the 
meaning of the third step, since the authors would not engage in an agreement contrary to 
their own interests. 
 
The certainty of this conclusion is however not entirely evident. Firstly, statistical 
representativity fails to make room for interests that are shared by few. While this is 
important in securing that CMOs only prioritise common interests of the group, it is evident 
that the third step also safeguards other interests that a rights holder might have in addition 
to the common ones. By the compromise forged in the CMO, some rights holders will 
always to an extent feel prejudiced; the members do so voluntarily, while the non-members 
have their exclusive rights limited.
180
 Besides, as will be discussed in 6.2.7, being a 
                                                 
178
 This is at least one central reason, although other parallel rationale exists: For a short presentation of the 
main rationale underlying copyright protection, see Lucie Guibault, Copyright limitations and contracts, The 
Hague 2002, pp. 7-16; Senftleben (2004) pp. 5-21. 
179
 Cf. for instance NU 1973: 21 pp. 83-84, implicitly. 
180
 On the other hand, in a normative perspective, this type of prejudice might very well be reasonable, in 
light of the harm otherwise caused the authors by the market failure situation in which the ECL is imposed, 
cf. 2.1. 
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member might sometimes create a stronger bond than being authors to similar works, thus 
challenging the presumption of representativity. 
 
Secondly, a requirement of „substantial‟ representation might imply that a „substantial‟ 
number of authors are not members of the CMO. While a certain statistical representativity 
may be presumed, certain authors might deliberately keep without of the collective 
solution. Considering furthermore that the requirement of substantiality pursuant to section 
38a NCA only comprises original rights holders, i.e. the actual authors, derivative rights 
holders are not necessarily represented.
181
 Article 13 TRIPS protects the “legitimate 
interests of the right holder” (emphasis added), thus it is clear that the interests of the latter 
group also are relevant. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the interests of the authors 
and derivative rights holders are not always concurrent. 
 
To exemplify, it is easy to envision that authors, publishers and other institutional copyright holders  
e.g. to highly specialised legal (non-fiction) literature wish to administer their rights individually due 
to the special character of their works. For instance, when it comes to routinely updated standard 
works, where law firms may be presumed to always need the newest edition in order to avoid liability, 
the rights holders would have an easier job in policing illegal use and in negotiating individual 
contracts than rights holders to works the use of which is impossible to estimate in advance. 
Considering furthermore that such works may be very expensive, the rights holders have even greater 
interest in operating an individual scheme. 
 
The example also shows how the market failure rationale is not uniformly valid: Mass use-situations 
do not necessarily entail market failure with respect to all works or groups of rights holders. As will be 
seen in 6.2.8 below, an opt-out right might nonetheless reduce significantly any prejudice caused by 
situations as the one just described. 
 
Thirdly, for the argument of representativity to be relevant, the third step must necessarily 
allow for collective regards: Evidently, market failure will seldom be so total, and 
                                                 
181
 Publishers are de facto represented in the relevant Norwegian CMOs, and enjoy a certain protection from 
their works being used without consent pursuant to the Norwegian Marketing Practices Act of January 9 2009 
section 25. 
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representativity never so comprehensive that no one author will feel more prejudiced than 
the rest. The fact that the third step refers to the interests of “the author” in singular (“the 
right holder” in the case of TRIPS) might nonetheless challenge this. Isolated from the 
context, the singular form arguably connotes individuality, in the sense that it is the effect 
of the limitation upon each and every author without regard to the overall effect upon the 
group of affected authors that is to be assessed. Undeniably, if a collective assessment were 
intended, this could have been expressed more clearly by referring to „authors‟ in plural. 
Notwithstanding this, it must be remembered that the third step inquires whether the 
prejudice is „unreasonable‟ – the connotation of which is not restricted to such 
individuality. Rather, the question is whether the limitation is underpinned by sufficiently 
strong policy considerations. Concerning this proportionality test it must be remembered 
that prior to the three-step test of the BC, many national copyright limitations existed which 
did not necessitate any individual assessment of the prejudice upon each affected author 
including the „fair use‟-principle of the UCA. To the contrary, e.g. the private use 
exemption of [the former] section 11 NCA struck uniformly without regard to the fact that 
evidently some authors would be prejudiced more than others by the same limitation. 
Remembering that the BC was conceived as capable of „grandfathering‟ existing 
limitations,
182
 it is thus contended that using the group of affected authors as a frame of 
reference is relevant. 
 
Lastly, while theoretical exercises may be useful to trace the logical limits of the advanced 
arguments, empirical facts must also be considered: The ECLs are mainly imposed in 
situations where individual licensing is deemed scarce and difficult; the agreements which 
have been imposed in practice do seem to concern usages that otherwise would have been 
difficult to exercise on an individual basis. 
 
For example, Kopinor‟s current ECL-agreements on reproduction in schools and universities precisely 
delineate the use that may be made of the works covered. In general terms, no more than 15 % of a 
work may be copied, and copying may not be done to substitute works that normally should be kept in 
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 Ricketson/Ginsburg (2006) p. 776. 
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stock. Furthermore, schools are prohibited from copying particularly vulnerable works such as one-
time-use booklets, forms and tables made especially for educational use: Otherwise, the very market 
for such works would be heavily prejudiced. Moreover, the agreements have special rules for works 
that are out of print, etc.
183
 
 
One can of course not just advance the „market failure‟-argument, and thus proceed to 
claim that the authors would have been badly off anyway. Market failure is an imprecise 
term, because it denotes characteristics of a factual situation without revealing the extent of 
market failure. For instance, in a market where 60 % of the use is contracted individually, 
20 % collectively and 20 % carried out illegally, there is evidently a part of the market that 
is subject to failure. Whether the market as a whole is to be deemed failing is a matter of 
opinion: The term „market failure‟ is not conclusive. In such a market the presumption that 
the collective (20 %) is representative for the interests of the 80 % other rights holders 
would in any case at best seem strained. The reality in which the ECLs are imposed is quite 
another, however. And, with respect to the Danish „omnibus‟-ECL pursuant to section 
50(2) cf. (4), the preparatory works expressly state that the Ministry of Culture is to ensure 
that authorisations are given only in situations where individual clearance is improbable.
184
 
 
6.2.7 The remuneration scheme 
While the CMO possesses a strong foothold when negotiating the ECL-agreement with the 
users, the question of subsequent distribution of the collected remuneration is central when 
it comes to assessing the level of prejudice inflicted upon the authors. The pecuniary 
interests of the authors are not served well by a high fee on the users if the collected money 
subsequently is put to use in a way that does not benefit them. 
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 Source: On-line access to the agreements on Kopinor‟s website. Available in Norwegian at: 
http://www.kopinor.no/avtaler/avtaleomraader. For the sake of interest, the previous agreement between 
Kopinor and the university/college sector ( in force until 2002) is available in English at 
http://www.kopinor.org/avtaler/avtaleomraader/universiteter_og_hoeyskoler/avtaletekst_moensteravtale. 
184
 Forslag L 58 proposed 30.01.2008, comment to section 50(4) 
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Concerning the distribution of the collected money, the outset is stipulated in section 37 
paragraph one NCA: The CMO decides how the collected remuneration is to be distributed. 
Consequently, it is up to the CMO to decide whether the authors are to be remunerated 
individually or collectively, including detailed determination of the distribution criteria.  
 
Central to the ECL is that the collective may be presumed to be representative also for the 
interests of the non-member authors. Thus, it could be argued that the stipulation of the 
remuneration scheme would be acceptable for the non-member rights holders as well. 
However, in certain respects, there is reason to believe that the member authors are not 
representative at all for the interests of the non-member rights holders. The distribution of 
collected payment seems to be one of these instances: In this case, being a member 
presumably creates a stronger bond than the one shared by holding rights to the same type 
of work. Left unattended this could easily have caused a quite unreasonable prejudice to the 
interests of the unrepresented authors. Hence, it is stipulated in section 37(1) NCA that the 
distribution criteria must be formulated in such a way that members and non-members are 
treated alike. 
 
By the latter requirement, the non-member rights holders are to have the same claim on the 
collected funds as the member authors. In case the funds are used for purely collective 
purposes, such as e.g. political lobbying, it must be ensured that the purpose is common for 
all the rights holders in the field.
185
 In case a more individual distribution is aimed at, e.g. 
scholarships, the CMO must ensure that the criteria for application are neutral with respect 
to organisational affiliation.
186
 
 
There is however still reason to question if- and how much the solution contributes to 
benefit the non-member authors affected by the limitative effect of the ECL. Whilst the 
distribution criteria might be neutral of appearance, there are several circumstances that 
might cause reality to be quite another. 
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 Ot.prp. nr. 15 (1994-1995) p. 148. 
186
 Ibid. 
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Firstly, there is the evident problem caused by section 38a paragraph one requiring only 
that the CMO represent a substantial number of “authors”. To the group of derivative rights 
holders there is probably little comfort in being safeguarded the same access to the 
collected remuneration as the represented authors, if the criteria for obtaining remuneration 
according to the collective scheme more easily are fulfilled by authors. And as can be 
remembered, the three-step test of the TRIPS is concerned with the interests of all rights 
holders. 
 
For example pursuant to the distribution formula for The Non-fiction Fund (Det faglitterære fond) 
managed by NFF (Norwegian Non-fiction Writers and Translators‟ Association), four categories of 
scholarships are awarded: A) Scholarships for concrete literary projects within the field of non-fiction, 
B) Travel scholarships, C) Pensioner‟s scholarships for authors above the age of 67 and D) Extended 
pensioner‟s scholarships. The applicant must document authorship (as author or translator) to at least 
one non-fiction work of at least 200 000 characters (including spaces), which must have been 
disclosed to the public. For scholarship C, a larger literary production is required.
 187
 
 
As will have appeared, these guidelines prioritise non-fiction authors that are still active as authors, as 
well as retired authors. On the other hand, all derivative rights holders as well as non-retired authors 
who do not currently produce non-fiction works are excluded from being awarded such scholarships. 
While this obviously discriminates the latter category of rights holders, it is nonetheless in accordance 
with the requirement that represented and non-represented authors be treated alike pursuant to section 
37(1) NCA: The distribution formula does not differentiate between members and non-members. 
Thus, the result is that a rather large group of rights holders to non-fiction works are denied the 
possibility of receiving individual remuneration. 
 
As a matter of form, it must be added that Kopinor, the CMO to which NFF is a member, also has 
publishers amongst its members. This ensures that at least some portion of the collected remuneration 
is channelled to certain derivative rights holders, namely the publishers. On the other hand, heirs and 
institutional owners except publishers are not so favoured. 
                                                 
187
 Cf. the guidelines for awarding scholarships from The Non-fiction Fund as decided on the annual meeting 
of The Norwegian Non-fiction Writers and translators‟ Association, March 2009. Available at: 
http://www.nffo.no. (Norwegian only) 
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Secondly, regardless of how neutral the distribution criteria might be in practice, there is 
the inescapable discriminatory reality that if the CMO should decide on a collective 
distribution scheme, member authors are more likely to be aware of the scheme than most 
non-member authors. This is even more the case of foreign authors. Thus, the non-member 
authors affected by the limitation benefit the least from the collective scheme.  
 
Those who benefit from the increased bargaining power pursuant to the ECL might very 
well be someone else than the authors whose works are used the most. This is a problem 
with all collective schemes, as they do not differentiate between authors whose works are 
more expensive or whose works are used more intensely. With regard to the imperatives of 
the third step, this is important, as a collective scheme might easily come to benefit authors 
whose works have not been used at all pursuant to the limitation. These authors have thus 
not experienced any prejudice from the limitation – only benefits. When in turn assessing 
the level of prejudice inflicted on the group as such, it would appear wrong to include these 
in the assessment, since their works in fact have not been used at all. Whilst the prejudice 
on the pecuniary interests of the authors affected would increase since the amount of 
available remuneration is reduced, the benefit experienced by the authors whose works are 
not used cannot be included as a counterweight. In sum, while the collective scheme might 
contribute to redistribute money from the successful authors to the less successful ones 
(this might have some normative value in itself), this does not contribute to lessening the 
prejudice inflicted on the authors by the limitation. 
 
In this sense, as pointed out by Rognstad, there is reason to question whether the ECL 
really is that much more advantageous for the affected author than a regular compulsory 
licence that at least secures him individual remuneration.
188
 Although a regular compulsory 
licence might weaken his bargaining power, it secures the author a remuneration that 
reflects the intensity of the performed use. 
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 Rognstad (2004) p. 155. Except of course section 30 NCA which requires individual remuneration. 
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Section 37(2) NCA confers on the non-represented authors a right to individual 
remuneration to the extent that they manage to substantiate that their works have been used. 
Pursuant to the preparatory works, it suffices to render probable the use e.g. by means of 
statistical analyses, in which case the remuneration would have to be determined in an 
approximate manner.
189
 
 
In real terms, however, the advantage of the right to the affected authors is debatable. The 
difficulty of demonstrating or substantiating that ones work has been used can be 
considerable, especially when the users do not contribute by registering the works used.
190
 
In the mass use situations covered by the ECLs pursuant to sections 13b, 14 and to a certain 
extent 16a (e.g. scanning and subsequent e-mailing of a book to a [library] loaner) the use 
takes place within the perimeters of the user-institution which substantially impairs the 
rights holder‟s chance of learning of- and much less proving or substantiating use of his 
particular work. In other cases, e.g. where a library pursuant to the ECL in section 16a 
makes scanned books available online, the use could be relatively easy to prove, but 
difficulties of learning of the use could still be considerable. 
 
In sum, for the CMO to choose a collective remuneration scheme over individual 
remuneration may very well amount to a de facto discrimination of the non-member rights 
holders – incidentally the group whose exclusive rights are being limited. In terms of 
justifying the prejudice as „not unreasonable‟, this clearly reduces the potency of the ECL-
model: Both because it impedes the affected rights holders from benefiting from the strong 
bargaining power of the CMO, and thus does not lessen the prejudice to any mentionable 
degree, and in a more normative perspective, because such discrimination easily could 
become „unreasonable‟ if it were possible to avoid by simple means. As contended by 
Senftleben, a limitation could easily come into conflict with the third step if it is not 
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 Ot.prp. nr. 15 (1994-1995) p. 148. 
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 Which incidentally is one of the main causes of the market failure situation of illegal use: The users have 
reduced incentive to obtain licences since the risk of detection is low. 
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necessary, meaning that “a limitation must be the least harmful of more than one available 
means to obtain a particular objective”.191 Naturally, this does not mean that any small 
difference between two alternatives is cardinal: The term “unreasonable” connotes, as 
mentioned earlier, that the prejudice must be of some qualified graveness before the 
limitation is rendered impermissible.  
 
An important argument is that collective schemes render ECLs more effective:
192
 The users 
need not register the works they use except once in a while for statistical purposes,
193
 and 
the CMO needs not use resources on finding the rights holders. Depending on how 
important effective rights clearance is deemed in the individual case, the policy objectives 
underlying the ECL might very well support the use of collective remuneration schemes 
through the scrutiny of the third step: It can of course not in general be claimed that such 
schemes are impermissible.
194
 On the other hand, it would seem rash to admit failure in 
reaching a solution that forges a better compromise between the aim of efficiency and the 
authorial interest in a remuneration that reflects the actual use of a work. Keeping in mind 
the above-mentioned uncertainty as to whether the CMO is representative for the interests 
of the non-members with respect to remuneration schemes, the fact that such individual 
schemes to a low degree have been implemented in Norway should not give rise to any 
strong assumptions of inefficiency. 
 
For instance in Denmark, the CMO Copydan Tekst & Node has implemented an individual 
remuneration scheme, where a selection of user institutions make one extra copy of all works copied, 
onto which the number of copies made and certain details about the work copied are written. 
Additionally, spot checks are conducted at certain intervals. Subsequently, these extra copies are sent 
to Copydan, which registers the rights holders and the number of copies produced. In turn these 
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 Senftleben (2004) p. 236 
192
 Cf. implicitly the argumentation of the Norwegian delegation in NU 1973: 21 p. 92 (Norwegian only). 
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 In order to determine the correct distribution formula from the CMO to foreign CMOs and in relation to 
the CMOs member-organisations. 
194
 For instance section 13b is seemingly such a case, where incidentally the cogency of the public interest in 
education explicitly is recognised in the limitation in article 10(2) BC. 
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„individual‟ numbers are adjusted according to general, nationwide statistical data, and the individual 
authors are remunerated accordingly. In case the sum payable to the author would be very low, the 
sum is retained at the CMO. Correspondingly with the portion of collected fees which correspond to 
works of indeterminable origin. Lastly, if the individual rights holders prove too difficult to find, the 
remuneration is retained at the CMO as well. After three years, if no rights holder has presented 
himself with a claim on the collected money, the money is put to collective use.
195
  
 
Purportedly, in 2008 Copydan Tekst & Node received 70 000 registered copies which in turn were 
converted to individual remuneration of approximately 30 000 rights holders.
196
 The administration 
costs of Copydan Tekst & Node amounted in 2003 to 15 % of the collected remuneration, whilst in 
2004 it amounted to 12%.
197
 In comparison, Kopinor, the Norwegian equivalent to Copydan Tekst & 
Node, incurred administration costs of roughly 11% of the collected remuneration both years.
198
  
 
It must of course be mentioned that the above numbers of Copydan and Kopinor, respectively, cannot 
automatically be compared to one another: There might be relevant differences between the 
organisations other than those caused by the chosen system of remuneration, which could affect said 
figures. Furthermore, the above numbers do not give expression to the transaction costs the individual 
remuneration scheme inflicts on the users. Thus, it is not possible to conclude on any reliable basis 
how the individual remuneration scheme affects the efficiency of the ECL model. Considering that 
there is little reason to believe that the Danish ECL regime should be motivated by significantly 
different policy objectives than the Norwegian one, there is in my opinion still grounds to draw a 
qualified assumption that individual remuneration is possible to achieve at a higher level without 
significantly prejudicing the efficiency of the solution. 
 
Any obligation to register works imposed on the user represents a transaction cost which 
could render the ECL less effective.
199
 There is a very significant distinction, however, 
between having to locate and negotiate with the rights holder in advance, and merely 
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 Source: Copydan‟s web pages, available at: 
http://www.copydan.dk/DK/Copydan/Om-Copydan/Fordeling_af_vederlag/Fordelingsmanual.aspx 
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 Source: Copydan Tekst & Node‟s annual report for 2009. Available at: 
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 For instance by inciting the user to use the work illegally instead. 
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registering the work after use. In the latter case, the ECL has already taken care of the 
negotiation of a fee, and all the user has to do is to register the work used. 
(Correspondingly, there is a relevant difference between locating rights holders in 
connection with the individual instance of use, and doing so in a centralised, professional 
unit.) 
 
Naturally, in the pre-digital age, keeping track of the works used in mass use-situations and 
locating rights holders could appear prohibitively troublesome and costly. In the 
contemporary „digital‟ age, there might on the other hand be reason to review this outset. 
Considering today‟s wide array of electronic aids, simple and cost-effective means of 
registering the works used seem at hand (adding to the apparent Danish success of 
manually sending in extra copies of used works from representative user institutions). 
 
For instance in the case of photocopying from books, a barcode scanner attached to the photocopier 
could be serviceable. Or for instance affixing RFID-chips onto the originals, which in turn could be 
registered by the photocopier. In the case of libraries, the very way in which libraries function by 
classifying and categorising works implies that creating a central database in which the use that was 
made of the works could be registered, would cause little trouble. For instance when the library scans 
its books, it would need to register the book. This information could in turn be forwarded to the 
relevant CMO. If the library should [pursuant to the prospective ECL-agreement] mail one of its 
loaners the digital copy of the book, it would seem rather simple to register this – at least not more 
problematic than the registration done during ordinary lending of books. 
 
Evidently, digital means are not going to solve all problems of registering works. There are 
still cases in which registering a work for individual payment will prove prohibitively 
burdensome. Nonetheless, adopting schemes of individual remuneration is not a question of 
yes or no: Total accuracy is of course not necessary in order to reduce the prejudice on the 
interests of the affected authors. It may be presumed that the [pecuniary] interests of the 
affected authors will be satisfied proportionally with the increase of individual 
remuneration. 
 
 93 
In sum, to the extent that the ECL model provides for individual remuneration, the 
combined effect of this and the increased bargaining power undoubtedly will substantially 
lessen prejudice of the affected authors‟ interests.200 While an exclusively collective 
remuneration scheme could be acceptable if the policy objectives underpinning the 
particular ECL required as smooth a rights clearance process as possible, the relatively 
small loss of efficiency entailed in supplementing the ECL with at least a certain degree of 
individual remuneration weighs heavily for supplementing the ECL-provisions with a 
certain directive to the CMOs in case – as seen in Norway, contra in Denmark – they 
should cling to the collective systems.
201
 
 
6.2.8 The opt-out right 
6.2.8.1 Introduction 
Although the ECL is crafted to minimise the prejudice on the interests of the affected rights 
holders, it still is a compromise between this and the aim of providing a smooth rights 
clearance procedure. 
 
It would be easy to voice arguments which question the availability of alternatives, when 
faced with the impediments of individual rights clearance in a failing market. Viewed from 
the perspective that illegal use and untapped potential is detrimental to society and should 
be rectified, the alternative to introducing limitations is not evident.
202
 The question of 
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 Cf. footnote 171. 
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 It must also be kept in mind that in addition to the above discussed reasons for not adopting an individual 
remuneration scheme, the non-recurring cost of implementing such a system could prove prohibitive if not 
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ECL, copyright is limited with the effect that certain parts of its rationale are given lesser priority to promote 
other parts of its rationale, it is evident that copyright itself cannot provide the answer to whether the 
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alternatives is however not exhausted at that: There is still the question of whether the 
limitation is necessary as it appears.
203
 The question of an opt-out right thus springs to 
mind: If the rights holders were allowed to opt out of the solution, this would – as will be 
seen below – have an unparalleled effect in lowering the prejudice of the ECL on their 
interests. On the other hand, any deviations from the collective scheme reduce its 
efficiency. 
 
6.2.8.2 What is opt-out? 
An opt-out right is an opportunity for the rights holder to escape the compulsory effect of 
the ECL. Whilst the ECL in practice entails a transfer of the authorisation right to the 
collective (or perhaps more precisely indirect management of the right by the collective), 
an opt-out clause [in its purest form] grants the author the opportunity to reverse this 
transfer, thus bringing the work back into his exclusive sphere of control. To the user of an 
ECL, the opt-out would imply that he is not allowed to use the work as far as the opt-out 
reaches. 
 
The opt-out right might come in many different shades, where the opportunity to opt out is 
delimited by e.g. rigorous procedures of announcing the opt-out, or outright delimitation of 
the extent to which opt-out is given effect. For instance, the opportunity to conclude 
individual licence-agreements with the users of an ECL-agreement which have priority 
over the latter may be seen as one modality of the opt-out right. Correspondingly, it is easy 
to envision different variations, where the author is allowed to opt out of certain parts of the 
ECL-agreement but not others.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
limitation is reasonable or not: The very copyright that the three step test is to safeguard is composed of all 
these individual rationales, and does not advise on any hierarchy between them. 
203
 Cf. 6.2.7. 
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6.2.8.3 What is the effect of an opt-out right on the assessment of prejudice? 
In chapter 2.4, it was established that ECLs are limitations in the sense that they need to 
pass the scrutiny of the three-step test. As can be remembered, this fact was not altered by 
the provision of an opt-out right. While it is clear that such a right would contribute to 
reduce the scope of the limitation, and thus its limitative effect on the respective rights, it is 
equally clear that it turns the outset of copyright upside down– namely that the author, and 
he alone, has a right to authorise the use of his work. 
 
Nonetheless, although an opt-out clause does not make the ECL avoid entirely the brand of 
limitation, it clearly entails a reduction in prejudice caused to the rights holders. As to the 
degree of reduction, this is evidently dependent upon the formulation of the right: The more 
„constricted‟ modalities, such as a right to conclude parallel licence agreements, are 
obviously less effective than a right to opt out entirely. Although the limited opt-out rights 
might formally give the author influence over the use of his work, the practical reality of 
such a right must also be taken into consideration. The right to conclude individual 
agreements for example, is probably of little use to the author if he has little more to offer 
the user than that which is provided by the ECL-agreement. 
 
The „full‟ opt-out right, on the other hand, serves the interests of the rights holders more 
effectively: By allowing the author to regain exclusive control over his work, the ECL is 
but a very small deviation from the outset of exclusive rights. With respect to the 
inconvenience of having to take positive action towards the CMO in order to opt out, the 
prejudice inflicted may be considered marginal (unless the opt-out procedure is very 
burdensome). It must be acknowledged, however, that while the author formally would 
regain his exclusive right when opting out, the practical reality could be quite different. The 
advantage of the ECL with respect to facilitating rights clearance lies in its blanket licence-
function – a function which might incite the user to refrain from controlling if the work has 
been opted out of the licence. On the other hand, this is a situation that stems from the very 
same market failure that the ECL in case has been introduced to counter: The same could 
easily be the case if a fairly broadly representative CMO without the support of an ECL-
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provision concluded a blanket licence with a user in a market that otherwise is 
characterised by illegal use. Thus, as long as the opt-out is announced in a fairly effective 
manner by the CMO, there seems to be little reason to classify the non-observation of the 
opt-out as a “prejudice” caused by the limitation. Hence, if implemented in a relatively 
effective manner, the opt-out right provides a strong reduction of prejudice within the 
meaning of the third step. Whilst it certainly would not be sufficient to see any limitation 
through the scrutiny of the third step, in combination with the ECL-model there is on the 
other hand reason to believe that reasonableness is within reach without the need for any 
strong normative justification. 
 
6.2.8.4 The opt-out in combination with the ECL. 
For the time being, only sections 30 and 32 NCA grant opt-out rights. For the remaining 
ECLs the question of opt-out is left to the collectives to decide, except section 34 in which 
the retransmission right due to EC-regulation is made subject to mandatory collective 
licensing.
204
 Furthermore, there might be reason to interpret the ECLs as allowing for 
individual agreements, due to certain remarks to this effect in the preparatory works.
205
  
 
When, as seen, the opt-out right has the effect of dramatically reducing the prejudice of a 
limitation on the interests of the rights holder, a question is why not all ECLs provide such 
a right. Indeed, the above discussed traits of the ECL-model entail a strong presumption 
that the prejudicial effect of the limitation upon the group of affected authors does not 
reach an unreasonable level. Nonetheless, the model fails to make room for the interests of 
the [few] authors who do not share the interests of the group. As the concept of 
                                                 
204
 Directive 93/83/EEC (satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission) article 9. 
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 Ot.prp. nr. 46 (2004-2005) p. 51-52. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Rognstad, it is not evident that the 
preparatory works should be decisive in this case, as the wording of said sections indeed does imply that the 
ECL should be given priority, Rognstad (2004) p. 159.  
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unreasonableness includes an assessment of the limitation‟s necessity,206 there is reason to 
examine why such a right is not always included.  
 
The main reason for leaving the question to the CMOs rather than including an opt-out 
right directly in the provisions seems to be the fear that such a right would render the ECL 
less effective in facilitating rights clearance.
207
 One of the main advantages of the ECL is 
after all that it is relatively uncomplicated for the user. Checking for works opted out of the 
ECL would evidently be an additional, complicating burden on the user. 
 
Additionally, the lack of opt-out clauses seems to have been founded in an unwillingness to 
provide a system that is vulnerable to exploitation by rights holders seeking to obtain 
unwarranted economic benefits.
208
 Evidently, „freeloaders‟ who used the opt-out right as a 
coercive tactic to obtain better terms than they otherwise would have managed (with or 
without the ECL) would harm the efficiency of the ECL-solution, in that it would be almost 
impossible to filtrate such attempts from „normal‟ use of the opt-out right. 
 
The argument should however , in my opinion, not be exaggerated: For the opt-out right to 
be useful as a coercive instrument, the number of authors using it this way would need to 
be low, lest there be no funds left to „freeload‟ on. In that case, however, the low number of 
opt-outs would probably be quite easy to respect: The problems pile up when the number of 
opt-outs increases. Additionally, the experiences from the Swedish ECLs pursuant to which 
the author is granted an opt-out right (except section 42f) seem to counter the fear of 
„freeloading‟: There are for instance no works currently opted out of the ECL for internal 
copying in businesses (section 42b).
209
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 Cf. 6.2.7. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Source: Bonus Presskoipa‟s web pages. The list where opt-outs would be published is available at 
http://www.bonuspresskopia.se/texter/read.php?mid=2016.  
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Regarding the concerns over loss of efficiency, the argument is more potent. Where an 
obligation to remunerate the rights holders individually probably could be implemented 
without too much loss of efficiency, there is a relevant difference between just registering a 
work that has been used, and having to check in advance if the work is covered by the 
scheme. Should the process become too cumbersome, the ECL risks losing efficiency when 
the user omits checking the status of the work, and thus proceeds to copy illegally. The aim 
of the ECL of making legal access to works so easy that it becomes a natural alternative for 
the user to copy legally would thus be frustrated. Where the ECL is imposed to release 
untapped potential,
210
 the inconveniency would imply that less potential is released. In both 
cases the ECL would be rendered less effective. 
 
Considering the effect upon the efficiency of the ECL, the omittance of an opt-out right is 
as a general contention defendable: The ECL does not thus become unnecessarily 
prejudicial to the interests of the authors. It must be remembered that the three-step test 
forbids the „unreasonable‟ prejudice: A certain qualified graveness is necessary to render 
the limitation inadmissible. The individual situations must however be assessed separately: 
Section 16a for example would probably be well suited for an effective opt-out right 
causing negligible loss of efficiency to the ECL, since it must be presumed that much of the 
use pursuant to the ECL is going to be scanning with subsequent making available of the 
work. In such purely digital uses, and especially in libraries which already use precise 
cataloguing systems, an opt-out right would seem easy to implement. 
 
Incidentally, the „orphan work‟-problem which is a main impediment to realising the vision of a 
„digital library‟ (which in turn was an important incitement to the imposition of section 16a) would to 
a large extent be solved even with the grant of an opt-out right: Anyone not expressly opted out would 
be covered by the ECL-agreement. 
 
                                                 
210
 E.g. section 16a NCA (which serves both purposes – both countering illegal use and untapped potential) 
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Newer technology will probably further facilitate the process of controlling the status of the 
work even in the „analogue environment‟ if, as envisioned with the remuneration right, 
technical appliances such as barcode scanners, RFID-chips or even manual keypads to type 
in e.g. the name of the author were employed to register the works used. In this case, it 
would be fairly easy to connect to on-line databases that could warn before exempted 
works are copied.
211
 This notwithstanding, even technical appliances cannot solve all 
problems. For instance printing from the Internet would probably be difficult to subject to 
an opt-out right unless the rights holders announced the opt-out on the web page itself. For 
retransmissions of broadcasts, irrespective of the ease of learning of an opt-out, such a right 
could prove positively devastating, since the company retransmitting the broadcast has no 
opportunity to change the contents of the broadcast.
212
 Nonetheless, there seems to be 
reason to review the outset that opt-outs generally cannot satisfactorily be implemented. In 
any case there is reason to ask whether leaving the question of opt-outs to the CMOs, as is 
the case in Norway, is the correct solution. Whilst this might ensure a dynamic approach 
where separate cases were given separate consideration, the very membership to the 
collective indicates that the rights holder prefers collective administration over individual 
management, in which case opting out would appear a contradiction (unless for „moral‟ 
reasons) 
 
In sum, the requirement that a limitation be necessary in order to remain „reasonable‟ does 
not generally require the ECL to include an opt-out right. While such a right would imply a 
significant reduction of prejudice, and as such would all but ensure that the ECLs passed 
the third step, an opt-out right would challenge the efficiency of the model. Depending on 
the importance of efficiency to the interests underlying the imposition of the ECLs, as well 
as the cogency of the latter, it might be reasonable to avoid an opt-out right. In other cases, 
as with the one outline above, an opt-out right would at least seem feasible to include. And, 
while it may not be strictly necessary, the inclusion of the opt-out right would at least serve 
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 Compare e.g. to the systems used in libraries to record and access information about the books. 
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 Cf. Directive 93/83/EEC (satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission) which expressly requires 
collective management. 
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as an important safeguard against „unreasonableness‟, keeping in mind the insecurity 
inherent to the ECL-model in that it relies on CMOs – entities out of the legislator‟s sphere 
of control – to manage the closer delimitation of the limitations (cf. 2.3.1). 
 
6.2.9 The digital impact on the ECL-model. 
 
The significance of the „digital‟ evolution is closely linked with the market failure rationale that so 
often is invoked in connection with justifying limitations.  
 
It has been claimed that modern, digital, technology might lead to a reduced need for limitations on 
copyright. It is easy to envision the establishment of central databases which contain rights 
management information on copyrighted works which are easily available to the users. In this case, the 
users would not be much more troubled by having to consult these registries than by registering the 
work used in accordance with individual remuneration schemes pursuant to ECL-regulation. The result 
would probably be that blanket licences are still granted by the collectives, while those who wish to 
stay out of the collectives successfully operate their own schemes (meaning that their works now 
would not be used without the user at least being aware of their opt-out). If the users wish to contract 
with the respective rights holder on the offered terms, this could be done. 
 
As to claiming that the digital evolution would render limitations unnecessary, this is in my opinion 
dubious.
213
 Firstly, the very long duration of protection entails that works made before the „digital 
revolution‟ will still be protected for many years to come. Secondly, the problem of concluding 
individual contracts does not go away once the rights holders are identified. Without collective 
schemes individual contracting could easily become a very cumbersome process. The same applies if 
the authors were to gain strict control with the use of their works by employing effective DRM-
systems. This would still not solve the problem as there in my opinion is reason to believe that the 
illegal use then would be transformed to untapped potential instead. 
 
Hence, there would in my opinion still be a need for ECLs and other types of limitations for the years 
to come. And, incidentally, as the digital evolution makes direct right management easier, an ECL 
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 Cf. Thomas Dreier in the „Rights Management Report‟ of Panel 1 of the EU-conference “European 
Copyright Revisited” in Santiago de Compostela, 2002, who mentions the view with respect to collective 
licensing. 
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furnished with the possibility of opting out could prove to be even less prejudicial to the interests of 
the rights holders than is the case today, as the digital appliances further lessen the burden of opting 
out and for the user to learn of the opt-out. 
 
6.2.10 Summary and conclusive remarks. 
The „edge‟ of the ECL-model [as a limitation] is in essence that the model contributes to 
lessen the prejudice upon the legitimate interests of the authors brought about by the 
simultaneously imposed limitation, thus [presumably] allowing for more extensive 
regulation of copyright than would be possible pursuant to e.g. compulsory licences.
214
 The 
contractual basis, the aim of representativity, the strong bargaining power and the fact that 
the system generates income where the authors otherwise would be victims to market 
failure (many authors would even be better off with the ECL than without)
215
 are central to 
this conclusion. Market failure also prejudices public interests, since it leads to illegal use 
of copyrighted works, which contributes to lessening the respect for the laws,
216
 as well as 
the entrapment of potential of use, which harms the aim of dissemination of knowledge and 
culture (as well as the authorial interest in remuneration). The positive effect on public 
interests by imposing ECLs is thus indisputable – the degree varying with the interest in 
question. 
 
The potency of claiming that the authors are better off by the limitation since there 
otherwise would have been market failure is on the other hand disputable. While all ECLs 
have been imposed in markets thought to be marked by such failure, it can be questioned if 
the market failure is of such a total character that no authors would have been able to 
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manage their works in a profitable manner despite the failure of the majority to do so. In 
case the answer is no, another question arises as to the potency of claiming that the ECL in 
any case ensures that authors are remunerated. In essence, the question is whether 
prejudicing a few authors can be justified by the fact that it improves the situation for the 
bulk of authors. It would seem that the rationale underlying copyright protection cannot be 
called on in this regard, since this rationale, as seen above, is the result of a balancing of 
different considerations that in sum supports the introduction of a copyright,- not 
limitations to it.  
 
However, in such cases where the rationale of copyright is unable to suggest a solution, it 
would seem natural that the three step test offered latitude to the states who wanted to 
regulate the conflict by using a limitation to alter the copyright balance. The above 
conclusion that both the second and the third steps allow for collective regards to be had, 
rather than requiring that the situation of each author be assessed individually adds to this. 
That the regulation in case coincides with a wish to promote certain public interests does 
not alter this. To the contrary: As seen, the concept of unreasonableness within the meaning 
of the third step directs a consideration of the public interests at stake. 
 
To answer the question initially posed, it can be determined that although in part being a 
limitation, the ECL-model does have qualities that significantly reduce the prejudice 
caused by the limitation. Although it cannot be ensured that ECLs only are imposed on 
uses that otherwise would be subject to [total] market failure, and notwithstanding the fact 
that many ECL-provisions are very broad, the contractual basis of the ECL in combination 
with the trait of representativity entail a presumption that the ECLs are delimited by the 
CMO in such a way so as not to unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
authors. The reason why only a presumption may be erected is that the ECL-model makes 
use of mechanisms external to the legislator to conduct the final delimitation of scope – 
mechanisms the legislator trusts to act in a certain way, but which it does not control. The 
ECL-model is thus not a carte blanche to impose limitations of all kinds irrespective of the 
„modality‟ of the ECL: For instance, while it is probable that the CMO will delimit the 
 103 
permitted uses vis-à-vis the user in a manner consistent with the interests of the whole 
group of affected authors, there is reason to believe otherwise with respect to the 
distribution of collected remuneration. The mitigating effect of the strong bargaining power 
of the CMO combined with the fact that the ECLs generate revenues in otherwise barren 
markets is lost on the unrepresented authors if the remuneration scheme is compiled such 
as to better serve the member authors. And while the prohibition on discrimination might 
level out the differences within the group of authors, the fact that representativity is not 
required vis-à-vis derivative rights holders definitely is a problem with respect to TRIPS. 
Whilst considerations of efficiency could perhaps justify the lack of a right to individual 
remuneration in certain cases, it is in any case clear that providing such a right would help 
redress the problem and thus help fortify the presumption that the ECL is delimited in a 
manner consistent with the three-step test. 
 
Lastly, the compromises that necessarily must be struck in the formulation of the ECL-
agreements entail that the ECL-model fails to allow for the various interests the authors 
might have but which are shared by few. Although the expression of these interests might 
not amount to the regularity needed to be labelled „normal‟, it is nonetheless to be 
remembered that copyright is individual at its outset, and that said deviations thus entail 
some „prejudice‟ in terms of the third step. Granting a right to opt out would in this case 
effectively redress the problem, and incidentally imply that only the most unfounded ECLs 
failed to pass the three-step test. Considering the inherent decrease in efficiency, the 
provision of such a right would nevertheless seldom be necessary, if the public interests 
served by the ECL were sufficiently cogent. 
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7 Compatibility with EC law 
7.1 The compatibility of ECLs with Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. 
7.1.1 Introduction 
Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society (ID), adopted in 2001, was introduced as a result of a 
growing concern within the Community over the effects of a disharmonious copyright 
system on the functioning of the internal market – especially in recognition of the 
importance of a strong production of copyright material to the European industry.
217
 The 
development of digital systems which allowed a radically new use of works, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, was both a cause and a driving force behind the work of 
launching a community-wide harmonisation of copyright protection.
218
 As opposed to 
earlier forms of use, which were broadly confined to the national territories, the 
transnational nature of digital networks sparked greater concern for the functioning of the 
internal market. At the same time, it was felt that the directive would need to provide a high 
level of protection in order to ensure that the authors were sufficiently incited to create. 
 
Pursuant to articles 2-4 (the „constitutive‟ provisions), the authors and certain other 
categories of original rights holders are to be provided with “the exclusive right to authorise 
or prohibit” (emphasis added) certain specified uses of their works, namely: reproduction 
(article 2); communication to the public and making the work available to the public 
(article 3); and the distribution to the public of [physical copies of] their works (article 4). 
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This relatively absolute outset is subsequently modified by a proviso in article 5 allowing 
(and in one case requiring) the member states to impose certain enumerated limitations on 
the rights granted. Pursuant to recital 32 of the preamble, the enumeration is intended to be 
exhaustive. 
 
The ECL-model is not mentioned in the list of article 5. However, recital 18 of the 
preamble states that the directive “is without prejudice to arrangements in the Member 
States concerning the management of rights such as extended collective licences” 
(emphasis added). A common conclusion – at least in Scandinavian legal literature – is that 
the [Nordic] ECL-model may be upheld on this basis: It is argued that within the meaning 
of the directive, ECLs do not constitute a limitation, but an arrangement concerning 
management of rights.
219
 
 
The ECL-model is arguably in part a rights management arrangement: With respect to its 
members, the case is clear: The CMO manages their by exercising the right of authorisation 
on their behalf. It does not itself use the works, nor is it entitled to reap the benefits of the 
use that it in turn authorises. With respect to non-members, the CMO is not being assigned 
any of their rights. Rather, the agreements concluded on behalf of its members are extended 
to cover the works of the non-represented authors. While the CMO thus never formally 
acquires their right of authorisation, it nonetheless exercises it on their behalf, if in an 
indirect manner. 
 
However, the conclusion that the ECL-model is permissible by virtue of being a rights 
management arrangement and not a limitation, is in my view not as evident as the cited 
opinions give the impression of. Recital 18 refers to “extended collective licences” as a 
form of rights management. Notwithstanding this, the extended application of a collective 
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licence entails that a user may use the works of the non-member authors without any 
authorisation having been given by them. Certainly the user is legally authorised to use the 
work, but the authorisation does not stem from the author or anyone he has entrusted with 
authorising the use of his work. Whilst the ECL might not be the typical limitation – or as 
some claim, not a limitation at all within the meaning of the directive – this feature of the 
ECL-model is nonetheless difficult to reconcile with the wording of articles 2-4, according 
to which it is the authors who are granted an “exclusive right to authorise or prohibit” 
(emphasis added) the use of their works. Besides, nowhere in said articles is the term 
„limitation‟ used. 
 
Against this background one must ask whether and to what extent there is room for ECLs 
within the framework of the directive. Whilst the preamble is traditionally given much 
emphasis, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has confirmed on a number of occasions 
that the preamble alone “cannot be validly relied on...as a ground for...interpreting [the 
actual] provisions in a manner clearly contrary to their wording”.220 Nonetheless, it is not 
the wording alone that decides the meaning of a provision – according to settled case-law it 
is, in interpreting a provision of Community law, “necessary to consider not only its 
wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of 
which it is part”.221 Although it may seem as if the ECL – if not a „limitation‟ – at least 
entails a slight alteration of the outset indicated by the wording of articles 2-4, it is not 
necessarily so that the provisions correctly interpreted must exclude the application of 
ECLs. 
 
In any case, it is evident that recital 18 is a central guide to understanding the place that the 
ECL-model has in the framework of the directive. In this relation, it is, as pointed out by 
Rognstad, far from certain what the preamble means by its referral to “extended collective 
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licences”:222 The concept is not further defined, and as shown in the above chapters, the 
ECL-model is but an abstraction of several different ECLs appearing in the Nordic legal 
landscape. Whilst the concept of „extendedness‟ indicates a central feature common to all 
ECLs, the ECL-model is not restricted to this trait. To the contrary, while ECLs share a 
common core, they also differ on important points: ECLs may have different modalities. 
Moreover, it must be kept in mind that although the term “extended collective licences” 
sets certain minimum requirements as to which traits all provisions that are to be 
categorised as “ECL” need have in common, it is not thereby evident that this common 
core, e.g. the requirement of representativity, which is all but identical to the Nordic ECLs, 
needs be identically formulated within Community legislation.
223
 
 
Lastly, it may in this regard be mentioned that irrespective of the conclusions that may be 
drawn from the above, the ECL-model is uncontroversial in the cases where the exhaustive 
list in article 5 warrants the imposition of a limitation. Arguably the ECL is less of an 
interference with the protected rights than compulsory licences and free use provisions. In 
this respect recital 18 may indeed serve as testimony. It could of course be claimed that the 
aim of harmony, which was one of the main contributors to the list in article 5 being made 
exhaustive, contradicts such a fortiori-reasoning.
224
 This would, however, be hard to 
reconcile with the fact that the limitations are facultative. Moreover, recital 36 states that 
fair remuneration may be provided to the rights holders at the discretion of the member 
states even where the listed limitations do not require the payment of such. It is difficult to 
imagine how the imposition of ECLs would further distort the internal market not already 
occasioned by allowing a heterogeneous practice of imposing the limitations listed. Thus, 
to the extent that the ECLs cover use that it in any case would be permissible to limit 
according to article 5, they are permissible. For instance, section 13b NCA and its Nordic 
equivalents arguably fall within the scope of article 5(3)(a). At the time of the adoption of 
the directive, section 14 NCA covered only analogue use, and thus fell within the scope of 
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article 5(2)(a) (although it is questionable whether this ECL provides authors with “fair 
compensation”). Since it was amended to cover digital use as well, it has lacked support in 
the list of article 5. Lastly, section 30 NCA is an example of an ECL which completely 
lacks a basis in article 5. 
 
7.1.2 Analysis 
In the following discussion of the admissibility of the ECL-model, recital 18 of the 
preamble appears to be a reasonable outset. While the admissibility of the ECL is 
ultimately determined by an interpretation of the operational provisions of the directive, the 
preamble is the only part of the directive which bears mention of the “extended collective 
licences”. More importantly, it also explicitly recognises it as an acceptable rights 
management arrangement which is not to be prejudiced by the directive. 
 
It should be mentioned that recital 18 was included after Nordic initiative during the 
negotiations of the directive.
225
 In the first proposal by the Commission the directive did 
not include any mention of the ECL-model,
226
 and the Nordic countries were anxious to 
safeguard the continued application of their ECLs through formal recognition in the 
directive.
227
 During the negotiations, there was purportedly consensus about the ECL being 
a form of rights management, and not a limitation.
228
 From this point of view the continued 
application of the ECL-model would not necessitate any specific provision in the closed list 
of permissible exceptions in article 5, a statement in the preamble that the directive would 
not prejudice rights management arrangements being sufficient. In consequence, a recital to 
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this effect was added in 2000,
229
where, to be on the safe side, an explicit mention of the 
ECL was included.
230
 
 
While recital 18 was naturally formulated with the Nordic ECLs in mind, the fact remains 
that the directive is a legal instrument of its own, independent from any definitions of the 
ECL-model that should appear in national, Nordic legislation. Nowhere does the preamble 
equate the term “extended collective licences” to the Nordic ECL-model, and in such cases 
consistent case-law from the ECJ confirms that Community law “must normally be given 
an autonomous...interpretation”.231 
 
In this autonomous interpretation, the formulation “extended collective licences” is 
admittedly not very clear. Notwithstanding this, it seems quite possible to infer form the 
wording at least a few central characteristics that a legal provision must have to fit within 
the concept of “extended collective licences”. Firstly, a collective licence must form the 
basis of the management scheme. This licence agreement must be voluntary (otherwise the 
addition of the word „extended‟ would be meaningless), and it must be of some magnitude 
with respect to the number of rights holders represented, cf. the adjective „collective‟ 
(otherwise it could simply have read „extended licences‟). Lastly, the arrangement must 
contain a compulsive element, in that the [voluntary] collective licence may be “extended”, 
which must be taken to imply that the licence agreement is extended by legal interference 
beyond its initial field of application. 
 
Judging by these traits, the construction has the same core as the Nordic ECL-model. 
However, while the closer determination of these features in the Nordic model is based on 
a comparison and an abstraction from the different Nordic ECLs, this procedure is not 
available to the directive, where the wording must form the basis for the interpretation. It 
can be noted that the word “collective” does not give any certain indication of how 
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representative the CMO must be. Moreover, whilst the method of abstraction gives grounds 
for asserting that certain traits, such as the opt-out right, are optional in the Nordic ECL-
model, the wording “extended collective licences” hardly necessitates this to be optional. 
The wording is simply neutral to whether this is required.  
 
Due to the principle of autonomy, seeking guidance in national legal systems is more of a 
last resort. The same does not apply in regard to other Community instruments. Unless 
otherwise is explicitly provided, directives are separate instruments which must be 
interpreted in their own right. Nonetheless, the “need for uniform application of 
Community law and the principle of equality”232 which underlie the principle of autonomy 
do not have the same importance in relation to other instruments of Community law. To the 
contrary there is good reason to take these into consideration as they form part of the same 
legal system, and as such constitute each other‟s context.  
 
In this regard, the Satellite and Cable Directive (SCD) which, inter alia, constitutes an 
exclusive right for the author to authorise communication to the public by satellite, is of 
relevance.
233
 Pursuant to article 3(1), it is to be ensured that said right can only be acquired 
by agreement. This is to preclude the member states from imposing compulsory licences 
that subsequently have effect in the whole community due to the „country-of-origin‟-
principle established in the directive (see below).
234
 Pursuant to the second paragraph, 
however, the member states are explicitly allowed to provide for the extension of a 
“collective agreement between a collecting society and a broadcasting organisation 
concerning a given category of works” onto non-represented rights holders of the same 
category, i.e. the imposition of an ECL. Although the directive mentions the “extension of 
a collective agreement”235, and not “collective licence”, as in the preamble of the ID, there 
can nonetheless be little doubt that they refer to the same arrangement.  
                                                 
232
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233
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234
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 Article 3(4). 
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The central observation is that although the directive intends to preclude statutory licences, 
it permits the imposition of ECL. Whilst this is done in the operational clauses of the 
directive, and as such does not pose the same methodological problem as encountered in 
the ID, it nonetheless serves to strengthen the perception that within Community legislation 
ECLs are seen as something different from the ordinary limitations. 
 
The implicit recognition of the ECL-model should however not be exaggerated: Firstly, the 
directive permits the imposition of ECLs on the condition that they provide the author with 
a right to opt out, cf. article 3(2) second subparagraph. As discussed at length in 6.2.8, the 
inclusion of an opt-out right has a considerably mitigating effect on the ECL. Secondly, 
when seen in connection with the condition pursuant to the third subparagraph, namely that 
the ECL be imposed only where the satellite broadcast simulcasts a terrestrial broadcast by 
the same broadcaster, it becomes clear that even with the provision of an opt-out right, the 
ECL was not uncontroversial. This is confirmed by the revised proposal of the 
Commission, which states that the second condition was included to ensure that the ECL 
“more or less only be applied in the context of national broadcasting” which in turn would 
ensure that “negative cross-frontier effects are excluded”.236 Initially, the Commission had 
proposed that the ECLs be prohibited, albeit with a certain transition period expiring in 
June 1997 for countries which by a certain date already provided ECLs in their national 
legislation.
237
 The European Parliament, however, opted for a “limited recognition”238 of 
the ECL-model, including the aforementioned conditions. 
 
Arguably, the SCD is a special case due to the „country-of-origin‟-principle established in 
article 1(2)(a), whereby the act of communicating the work to the public by satellite is 
determined to occur solely when “the program-carrying signals are introduced into an 
uninterrupted chain of communication leading to the satellite and down towards earth”, 
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irrespective of whether the signals are received in other member states. The principle 
consequently allows the member states‟ domestic legislation to gain community-wide 
impact, which obviously necessitates harmonisation of the permissible arrangements 
concerning copyright. Nonetheless, the fact that it was deemed necessary to introduce such 
conditions on the ECL is an indication that despite being given a certain recognition, the 
ECL is not necessarily a suitable solution irrespective of its composition. 
 
In this regard it is worth noting that of the ECLs which existed in the Nordic countries at 
the time of the adoption of the ID, only one, namely section 30 NCA and its Nordic 
counterparts, lacked all basis in the list of exceptions in article five. Considering that this 
particular ECL provides the author with a right to opt out, it arguably is of the least 
invasive kind. While the wording of recital 18, “extended collective licences”, gives little 
clue in determining whether the permissible ECLs should provide the author with a right to 
opt out, the demonstrated trend might nonetheless give reason to interpret it that way. 
Incidentally, granting the author a right to opt out, whereby he is allowed to escape the 
compulsory effect of the ECL, does indeed make the ECL less of a deviation from the 
wording of the constitutive provisions: The author is clearly reserved his right to “prohibit” 
the use of the work, and although the users might legally use his works without his 
authorisation until such „prohibition‟ has been given (if covered by an ECL-agreement, that 
is), opting out would restore the need for authorisation from the author. Thus, the ECL 
would appear as less of a limitation, further strengthening its character of rights 
management. Considering that recital 18 describes the “extended collective licences” as 
“arrangements...concerning the management of rights”, this might thus suggest that ECLs 
within the meaning of recital 18 include a right to opt out. 
 
Pursuant to article 9, the SCD does impose an arrangement which arguably fits the 
description of ECL as can be inferred from the wording of recital 18 of the ID, but does not 
include any right to opt out. With respect to cable retransmissions, collective management 
is made mandatory (article 9(2)) – those who have not voluntarily transferred the 
management of their rights to the relevant CMO are all the same deemed (irrefutably) to 
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have mandated the CMO to exercise their rights. Moreover, instead of providing the author 
with an opt-out right, the directive does the exact opposite by forbidding the rights to be 
exercised individually. Although formally the term “extended collective licences” 
encompasses such provisions, it is nonetheless just as clear that the obligatory collective 
management is a more thorough deviation from the outset of an “exclusive right to 
authorise or prohibit”, than the „ordinary‟ ECLs which do not deprive the author of the 
right to exercise his right individually. Also, it is noteworthy that technically speaking, 
article 9 makes use of a presumption, and not an „extension‟. While the reality in such a 
distinction is debatable, it serves as an argument for interpreting the “extended collective 
licences” pursuant to recital 18 of the ID as a separate arrangement. Furthermore, the 
arrangement pursuant to article 9 of the SCD is warranted in the operational clauses of the 
directive, and thus is not problematic. Finally, the very particular situation of cable 
retransmission, which does not allow for any individual clearance, much less clearance 
prior to the retransmission, unless the market should become completely impaired, clearly 
indicates that this particular provision is more of an exception than the rule. 
 
What is noteworthy about article 9, however, is the fact that when the Community was 
faced with the situation of a potentially complete market failure if the exclusive right were 
to be normally upheld, it chose collective licensing as the remedy, rather than imposing 
compulsory licences. Whilst article 9 might not serve as a pattern for ECL-arrangements 
that are to be in conformity with the ID, it serves as a further recognition of the ECL-model 
in addressing market failure. Instead of reducing the economic potential of the exclusive 
right by removing the need for authorisation prior to certain uses, the potential vis-à-vis the 
users is upheld, with the slight alteration that the author must accept that the right is 
exercised by a collective. Against this background it is not surprising that the ECL-model is 
referred to as „rights management‟ rather than a limitation: The level of protection remains 
the same, as does the need for prior authorisation.  
 
Incidentally, the effectiveness of the ECL in addressing market failure, while 
simultaneously safeguarding the interests of the affected authors though active 
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management, is the main argument for why ECLs should not be seen as contrary to the 
rights granted by articles 2-4 of the directive. Despite the apparent conflict with the 
wording of the constitutive provisions, the exclusive right proves no hindrance to the ECLs 
insofar as they contribute to lessening the effects of market failure. As accounted for above, 
the ECJ has on a number of occasions underscored the importance of the context and 
objective of the community instruments to the interpretation thereof. Thus the objective of 
the ID is indeed missed in the cases of market failure. 
 
While the formulation of the constitutive articles clearly fulfils the aim of achieving a high 
level of protection,
239
 it is equally clear that this aim has no intrinsic value. On the contrary, 
a high level of protection was perceived as necessary in order to “foster substantial 
investment in creativity and innovation”, which in turn would boost European industry.240 
In line with the common reasoning that exclusive rights can be used to generate economic 
reward, a high level of protection would “guarantee the availability of such reward”, and 
thus serve as incentive to intellectual creation and the investment in such, since the rights 
holders could expect to get satisfactory returns on their investment.
241
 
 
In the situations of market failure however – whether it be the situation of illegal use or the 
entrapment of potential use – the high level of protection loses its function as incentive. In 
these cases, the exclusive right is in fact counterproductive: The prohibitive trouble (and 
cost) of having to contact the rights holder, and of having to do so in advance, leads the 
user either to use the work illegally or refrain from using the work (in practice: use fewer 
works than he would have, had the transaction costs been lower). In both cases the rights 
holder receives no remuneration, and the exclusive right therefore fails to guarantee the 
requisite reward. Additionally, it can be noted that illegal use entails a disrespect for the 
law, which by any standard is unfavourable. The entrapment of potential, on the other 
hand, entails that the exclusive right is respected, but the author is deprived of 
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remuneration that the user otherwise would have been willing to pay, and society is 
deprived of the desirable dissemination of works. 
 
A certain scepticism has been voiced in respect of answering rights clearance problems by 
reducing the scope of protection,
242
 and recital 22 explicitly states that the objective of 
disseminating culture must not be sought attained by reducing the scope of protection. 
Additionally, the wording of the constitutive provisions hardly suggest the procedure. 
However, recital 18 is clear: Extended collective licences are not to be prejudiced. 
Moreover, the ECL is as asserted not a limitation of the scope of protection, in that it keeps 
intact the potential of copyright vis-à-vis the users – it is only with respect to managing the 
right that it entails a minor limitation. While the preamble alone may not derogate from a 
clear wording, the fact remains that  rather than conflict with the provisions, the system 
pursuant to recital 18 is in harmony with the objective of the directive. It generates 
remuneration and allows the authors to stipulate terms of use where the factual situation in 
lack of the ECL would be that the works were used illegally (or not at all). At the same 
time, this correspondence of objectives indicates the extent to which the ECLs may be 
applied under the directive (see below). 
 
It can of course be asked whether the aim of community-wide harmony, which is also 
central to the directive, contradicts such a finding. The exhaustive list in article 5 is meant 
to safeguard harmony (as well as a high level of protection). Nonetheless, this argument 
may be rejected on the grounds that the effects on the internal market are hardly worsened 
by imposing an ECL, than what already is the case due to the market failure. There is 
hardly any difference between providing (cross-border) products and services in a market 
that is actually failing, and doing so in a market which would have been failing if it were 
not for the ECL imposed. (And in the latter case, the authors do at least receive some form 
of remuneration which is in line with the purpose of creating incentives.) Moreover, if the 
ECLs are found to be permissible, the ID does not require that other member states 
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recognise ECL-agreements concluded with foreign CMOs. Thus, to the extent that there are 
geographic differences with respect to the degree of market failure within the internal 
market, the ECL needs not become an interference with the functional markets.  
 
On-line transmissions in digital networks, such as the Internet, may alter this outset a little: 
Cross-border services are easily provided and subscribed to in the digital network 
environment. While the EC has not acted to regulate the [hitherto unsolved] question of 
where the copyright relevant acts are to occur in such cases, the fact remains that the 
threshold of providing cross-border services might be lowered considerably if the digital 
service is lawful in the country of origin. The risk might nonetheless quite easily be 
reduced if the ECLs are explicitly confined to the national territory – a solution which is 
strongly advocated by mentioned article 3(2) of the SCD, and implicitly also recognised as 
acceptable. This also seems to be the current practice: E.g. the aforementioned ECL-
agreement pursuant to section 16a NCA, which enables the National Library to make 
available a number of works on the Internet, explicitly confines the ECL to users with 
Norwegian IP-addresses.
243
 
 
Pertaining to the benefit of legal harmony, implying that the content providers have the 
same legal framework to deal with within the internal market, the aim of harmony is 
undermined by the multitude of optional limitations provided for in the directive. As 
concluded in the report of Hugenholtz et al. on the implementation of the ID, any harmony 
that might have been sought attained in this perspective has in practice been hampered by 
the varying practice of implementing the permitted limitations.
244
 On this factual basis, the 
aim of legal harmony hardly contradicts the ECL.   
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Against this background, there are reasonable grounds for asserting that the ECL-model is 
compatible with the ID. Meanwhile, the latest findings also give reason to review which 
modalities of the ECL-model that may be accepted under the ID. A part of this has already 
been discussed in the above review of the opt-out right pursuant to the SCD. Furthermore, 
there is reason to question whether other requirements may apply although they cannot 
clearly be inferred from the wording of recital 18. The abovementioned restriction to the 
national territory is central in this respect. 
 
The correspondence of objectives between the ECL-model and the ID, which is central to 
the ECL being compatible with the directive, also indicates the extent of applicability of the 
ECL. While the term “extended collective licences” in recital 18 is silent in this regard, a 
sliding scale may be appropriate: The more a market is failing, the more invasive the ECL 
can be. If the market failure is moderate, there might in addition to an opt-out right, be 
reason to require the authors to be individually remunerated. Whilst this obviously harms 
the efficiency of the ECL in facilitating rights clearance at a low cost, such a right has a 
mitigating effect on the ECL which brings it more in conformity with the fact that the 
constitutive provisions grant the author individually the exclusive right (see 6.2.7). 
 
Regarding the right to opt out of the ECL, the effects of such a right on the efficiency of the 
model has been discussed in 6.2.8. Providing the right to opt-out will prejudice the 
efficiency of the ECL, also with respect to the ability of generating income for the authors. 
While not providing for such a right could be conforming to the aim of maximising the 
profit (and thus the incentive) for the authors, which is inherent in the ID, the opt-out right 
on the other hand substantially mitigates the invasive character of the ECL. Earlier 
legislation has on this point required that the authors be enabled to opt out, and considering 
the emphasis on the ECL being a rights management arrangement, there is in my opinion 
little reason to believe that this view has changed. To the contrary, said emphasis tends to 
bear out the interpretation that the least limitative modality be chosen. It might be noted 
that if recital 18 was intended to safeguard the continued application of the Nordic ECLs, 
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the only ECL which at that time lacked basis in the list of article 5 did include the right to 
opt out. 
 
Questions might also be asked in relation to the ECLs which employ obligatory conflict 
resolution
245
 where ECL-agreements fail to be concluded. In the cases where it is the user 
who requires arbitration, the ECL loses much of the voluntary basis that prompted the 
perception of it as a „rights management‟ arrangement rather than a limitation. Although 
both parties will be bound by the outcome of the arbitration – not only the authors – this 
hardly alleviates its limitative function: The fact remains that the users are given an option 
to use the works of the authors on terms fixed without any voluntary participation. Thus, 
the inclusion of such obligatory regimes is in my opinion at best dubious. 
 
Lastly, there is reason to question whether the current section 50(2) DCA will be accepted 
as a correct implementation of the directive. In effect it introduces an ECL where ECL-
agreements may be given effect in any market without the need for further legislative 
action. To be sure, authorisation is needed, and is to be given by the Ministry of Culture. 
However,  it might be asked whether the delegation, to the ministry, of the individual 
assessment of whether a market is sufficiently ridden with failure entails a sufficiently clear 
and predictable delimitation of the „omnibus‟-ECL – especially in lack of any practice on 
the grant of such authorisations. Because the ECL technically implies a limitation of 
copyright, the definition of the ECL is of importance to the „rights and obligations‟ of 
persons within the community. In such cases, case-law from the ECJ shows that a 
reasonable degree of clarity and certainty is required.
246
 
 
Lastly, the three-step test in article 5(5) requires a short mention. Pursuant to said section 
the limitations to the rights provided for in article 5(1)-(4) shall only be applied in “certain 
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-
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matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder”. While 
it only applies to the listed exceptions, there is in my opinion reason to require that also the 
ECLs pass this three-step test. Although the permissibility of the ECLs has not been 
addressed in article 5, there is as shown no reason to interpret this as implying that the ECL 
is not a limitation. To the contrary, the ECL does entail a certain limitation of the exclusive 
right, if little invasive in the modalities permitted pursuant to the ID. In this regard, recital 
44 clearly states a main principle underlying the inclusion of the three-step test in the ID, 
which should be guiding in the determination of its field of application: Limitations applied 
in accordance with the directive should not be contrary to international obligations, where 
the protection required by the ID overlaps with that of the said instruments. Where the 
ECLs thus limit copyright as granted both in the ID and the conventions, there is reason to 
require that they pass the scrutiny of the three-step test. Regarding the outcome of such 
assessment, the reader is referred to the discussion in chapters 3-6 above. 
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